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Mental health practitioners rely on digital systems to interact with and in some instances treat 
patients (Hydari, Telang, & Marella, 2015; Recupero, & Rainey, 2005).  Yet, while widespread 
use of digital devices provides significant practical advantages, that same use exacerbates the 
possibility of a cyber breach (Guterman, 1999). This research describes mental health 
practitioners’ current cyber security practices and the factors influencing their behavioral 
intentions to implement cyber security within clinical mental health settings. Factors assessed 
included knowledge, self-efficacy, norms, threat awareness and penalties. Mental health 
practitioners (n = 210) from across the United States formed the sample population, received a 
Qualtrics on-line survey link through their affiliated professional organizations, and responded 
with the completed survey. Data was analyzed using structural equation modeling and 
SmartPLS. Results indicated although practitioners profess knowledge of legal and ethical 
requirements, actual behaviors do not reflect those assertions. Practitioners claimed knowledge 
of federal law (76.7%); knowledge of state law (70.5%); and knowledge of ethical guidelines 
(90.5%), yet only 32.4% of practitioners have conducted a risk assessment within the last year 
and more than 50% do not know how to conduct an assessment. Additionally, more than 20% of 
our colleagues believe professional liability insurance alone will prevent financial losses from a 
breach. Finally, 66% of our colleagues believe the cyber security threat is exaggerated. These 
findings suggest practitioner understanding of the requirements for addressing privacy and 
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Chapter 1 – Introduction  
As in the general population, the use of digital capabilities in clinical practice continues 
to expand among mental health providers. However, although many clinicians employ digital 
systems, there is yet little practitioner understanding of the threats and security imperatives that 
would enable alignment of cyber security decisions with legal mandates and professional codes. 
In addition, limited research exists on the use of cyber security in private mental health settings. 
However, Claar (2011) states that research that does exist states that many clinicians do not 
understand the vulnerabilities inherent in the use of digital systems. As a result, mental health 
practitioners working in clinical settings exercise few cyber security protections and have limited 
awareness of the risks they are accepting on behalf of their clients, themselves, and potentially 
their colleagues. Furthermore, while federal guidelines and professional standards describe 
ethical and legal requirements to minimize cyber security risk, methods for implementation 
remain broad with limited details on specific actions required to defend client and clinician data 
(Kobus, 2015). 
In that regard, this study provided descriptive insights into the cyber security knowledge, 
legal and ethical understanding, and decision processes of mental health practitioners. 
Establishing those insights provides the therapeutic community with a refined understanding of 
practitioner compliance with cyber security guidance within clinical settings. Furthermore, 
survey results examined through various theoretical lenses continue to develop understanding of 
the factors that influence a therapist’s behavioral intent within clinical settings. Notably, theories 
which emphasize the effects of norms (social learning theory, open systems theory, control 
theory, social control theory, theory of planned behavior), self-efficacy (expansive learning 
theory, general deterrence theory, theory of planned behavior), and threat awareness (open 




systems theory, risk homeostasis, TRIRISK model) were proven to have significance in 
determining a clinician’s behavioral intent. Finally, analysis of data enabled partial closure of 
significant gaps in existing cyber security and risk assessment literature, enabled development of 
initial clinical practice security recommendations for consideration, and may assist therapists in 
implementing cyber security capabilities aligned to practice priorities, resources, and legal and 
professional mandates. 
This study consists of a thorough literature review of motivational and risk perspectives 
directed toward establishing an understanding of cyber security awareness for practitioners when 
using digital systems. Furthermore, the primary researcher created a measurement instrument 
adapted from previously validated research (Herath & Rao, 2009; Rhee, Kim, & Ryu, 2009; S. 
Boss, Kirsch, Angermeier, Shingler and R. Boss, 2009; Ajzen, 2002) and modified or developed 
questions to focus specifically on therapist influence factors aligned to behavioral intent. 
Analysis of responses from mental health clinicians compared to federal guidelines and 
professional standards produced insights into both clinician recognition of ethical and legal 
responsibilities and use of cyber security within a representative population. 
Statement of the Problem 
Although mental health practitioners increasingly rely on digital systems for medical 
records, scheduling, collaboration with colleagues, and other business functions, clinicians 
remain largely unaware of the sophistication of the cyber threat. Ranging from state actors 
through criminals and novice hackers, the tools and techniques employed by those seeking to 
breach digital systems increases more rapidly than protective measures. Additionally, many 
clinicians and associates within a practice anticipate that digital systems are basically secure yet 
interconnections of devices, wireless connectivity and service providers to include the cloud and 




or third-party colleagues introduce substantial vulnerabilities (Tschider, 2017). This 
misunderstanding of technology creates significant vulnerabilities in any clinical systems 
configuration. Furthermore, misunderstandings surrounding legal and ethical requirements 
compounds the risk clinicians accept.  As a result, mental health professionals accept far more 
risk than anticipated and provide hackers with varied avenues to attack vulnerable systems.  
With those ideas in mind, many questions surface in respect to why clinicians approach 
cyber security with only a risk tolerance or perhaps risk acceptance perspective. Four risk 
mitigation approaches are available to anyone using digital systems: risk acceptance, risk 
avoidance, risk mitigation, and transferring risk (Howard & Jawahar, 2002). All these measures 
are in fact important considerations for effective cyber security and solely relying on any one 
approach increases the likelihood of damage for the clinician, clients, and colleagues if a breach 
occurs.  Consequently, exploration of a clinician’s behavioral intent becomes an important area 
in evaluating the rationale for the choices clinician’s make when deciding how to approach cyber 
security.  
Assessing behavioral intent involves understanding the factors that influence a clinician’s 
decisions to implement cyber security within their practice. Factors assessed in this research 
include knowledge, self-efficacy, norms, threat awareness and penalties and were selected based 
on previous theoretical studies. Identifying the areas which provide the most compelling reasons 
for clinician behaviors may lead to approaches to correct gaps in training and educational 
programs, establishing awareness of risk strategies, and developing enhanced methods to 
implement the broad legal and ethical requirements that exist today.  
Finally, another essential aspect of the cyber security challenge involves penalties for 
inaction. As cyber threats continue to increase in numbers of attacks and sophistication, the 




financial penalties associated with failure to comply with mandated requirements are also 
increasing. Fines ranging in excess of $100 per record and potentially much more for repeat 
violations are now viewed as reasonable judgements against noncompliant organizations. 
Furthermore, the Office of Civil Rights (OCR) that oversees HIPAA regulations for the federal 
government has imposed penalties of $1.5 million to $5.5 million for firms that displayed 
significant negligence (Conaty-Buck, 2018). Finally, legal defense fees may also contribute to 
the costs associated with a cyber breach. In one instance, a small medical laboratory stated it 
“was forced to wind down operations and stop diagnosing cancer” because of the “crushing 
burdens imposed upon it by the FTC’s investigation and ensuing action” (Selznick & 
LaMacchia, 2017, p. 248). Results generated in this study provide perspective into the behavioral 
intent of clinicians as they interpret the risk-reward aspects of cyber security – the costs of taking 
cyber security action compared with the costs of a sensitive information breach. 
Research Question 
The questions posed in this research concern the current practices of clinicians and the 
factors which serve to influence a therapist’s behavioral intentions to address the protection of 
sensitive information and systems in clinical practice. Specifically, the research question was, 
what factors (e.g., knowledge, self-efficacy, threat awareness, norms, and penalties) serve to 
influence a therapist’s behavioral intentions to address the protection of sensitive information 
and systems in clinical practice? Survey questions were developed to test the relationship 
between the clinician’s perspectives on each of the five factors and their intent to employ 
methods to protect sensitive information and digital systems. Hypotheses centered on the impact 
of all five factors on the clinician’s postulated behaviors or actions. Each hypothesis was 
structured to relate to not only specific behavior intent (e.g., impact of Knowledge on 




Knowledge Behavioral Intent) but also aggregated factors to provide insight into the combined 
effects of all factors (e.g., Knowledge, Self-efficacy, etc.) against combined behavioral intent. 
Rationale for the Study 
This study has both practical and descriptive relevance. In a practical sense, mental health 
therapists must adhere to legal and ethical mandates in protecting client and clinician data and 
digital systems from compromise. However, the literature suggests that legal and ethical 
mandates alone have not proven to compel significant motivation toward effective action in areas 
of cyber security. While significant literature exists on risk and motivational influence in 
decision making, Bruch and Feinberg (2017) make the case that a lack of focused work to 
integrate those insights leaves significant space for research directed toward the application of 
process models that affect real world scenarios. Consequently, adding to the current body of 
knowledge on mental health standards of practice, motivational influencing factors, and 
behavioral intent analysis for cyber security decision-making will enhance the profession’s 
ability to gain insights that may advance protections of sensitive information and systems. 
Current Practices 
Literature investigated, and the on-line survey also provided insight into the current use 
of digital systems as a standard of practice. Additionally, the literature and the survey also 
established insight into the cyber security capabilities incorporated in practices and the factors 
which influence therapist risk decisions as a function of behavioral intent. Specific factors 
incorporated in this research include knowledge of laws and ethical guidelines, self-efficacy in 
implementing protective measures, understanding of threat intent and capabilities, the norms for 
adhering to typical security practices within the mental health community, and the recognition of 
the impact penalties may have for non-compliance. Selected motivation, influence, risk, and 




family theories were used to assess the influencing factors for cyber risk mitigation when aligned 
to behavioral intent in decision making. Results show that while therapists report they are 
knowledgeable of the laws and ethical guidelines which mandate specific actions for client 
confidentiality and privacy, few precautions are taken to address the potential for compromise. 
Instead, a significant majority of therapists take a risk acceptance attitude in implementing cyber 
security within their practices. Furthermore, even when conscious decisions to implement cyber 
security precautions are made, therapists may be largely unaware of security possibilities, sub-
optimize their available alternatives, and consequently, do little to mitigate the client’s and 
clinician’s cyber security risks (van Schaik, Jeske, Onibokun, Coventry, Jansen, & Kusev, 2017).  
Behavioral Intent Research 
Significant behavioral intent research emerges from psychology, sociology, business and 
many other disciplines where explaining human motivation offers an ability to shape behavioral 
conditions. In fact, understanding the factors that affect decision making may provide guideposts 
for educational programs, organizational success, and legal and ethical policy formulation. The 
theory of planned behavior refined from the theory of reasoned action suggests that behavioral 
intent is associated with attitude, norms, and self-efficacy when aligned with the expectation of 
desired outcomes (Kidwell & Jewell, 2003). Additionally, these authors further suggest that 
perceived outcomes are affected by both internal and external factors. Consequently, although 
several other theoretical constructs (e.g., social control theory, general deterrence theory, etc.) 
were used in selecting factors for this research model, behavioral intent can be seen as the 
combined impact of knowledge, self-efficacy, norms, threat awareness, and the perceived 
likelihood of penalties in producing protective security action. Furthermore, knowledge as a 
basis for any of the factors considered may form a necessary precursor in every area studied. 




Limitations of the study 
While this research provides significant insights into the current practices and corollary 
behavioral intentions of mental health therapists surrounding the implementation of cyber 
security, it is not intended to be exhaustive and consequently may not reflect all levels of 
understanding nor all approaches to cyber security within the mental health community. 
Furthermore, the study does not claim to address all practice types nor large institutional 
organizations. More broadly, further research may be required to gain additional perspective into 
the nature and dynamics of cyber security in other mental health settings. Finally, this research 
does not attempt to assess in-depth knowledge of an individual clinician’s cyber threat 
understanding nor the clinician’s specific ability to implement cyber security technologies within 
a practice. Consequently, other factors may also contribute to a therapist’s behavioral decisions. 
Another limiting factor concerns the instrument itself. Surveys have been assessed as 
constituting a potentially problematic sampling design based on both voluntary bias and response 
bias. Also, a self-selected sample may produce unrepresentative results of the larger professional 
population as those most familiar with cyber security may feel more willing to complete survey 
questions. Consequently, surveys may misrepresent the intended research population. Similarly, 
respondents may answer survey questions to conform with or deviate from anticipated researcher 
preferences. Providing an anonymous link is used here to provide partial control for potential 
survey bias yet caution in interpreting findings is warranted. Furthermore, to address response 
bias, neutral phrasing was incorporated into survey questions. 
With those limitations in mind, further quantitative and qualitative research may provide 
greater detail with which to create specifically designed implementation practices for 
standardizing cyber security within professional mental health settings. Although inferred vice 




causal relationships may produce insights into future research areas, test results should be 























Definitions of significant terms 
Advanced Persistent Threat (APT): is an attacker (usually nation-state sponsored) who 
attempts to gain access to a network, remains undetected and removes (exfiltrates) data and/or 
creates conditions for later network exploitation. (Kissel, 2012) 
Black Hat: a hacker who "violates computer security for little reason beyond 
maliciousness or personal gain. (Gregg, n.d.) 
Cracker: a computer user who attempts to break into copyrighted software or network 
computer systems. (Gregg, n.d.) 
Cyber security: technologies, processes and polices designed to protect networks, 
computers, programs and data from attack, damage or unauthorized access. (Kissel, 2012)  
Federal Trade Commission (FTC): Department of Commerce organization created to 
protect consumers from unfair business practices. FTC has the authority to create cyber security 
policy, enforce laws and inspect businesses for non-compliance with regulations. (U.S. FTC, 
2010) 
Grey Hat:  a computer hacker or computer security expert who may violate laws or 
ethical standards but without specific malicious intent. (Gregg, n.d.) 
Hacker: one who breaks in to computer systems via communication networks - includes 
those who debug or fix security problems, and the morally ambiguous. (Gregg, n.d.) 
Hacktivist: user of computers to promote a political agenda. (Gregg, n.d.) 
Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act (HITECH): 
Title XIII of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act covering responsibilities for digital 
protections in healthcare. (Hecker, et.al, 2014) 




Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA): Executive Order 
13636 created a requirement to maintain security for the confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability of client health  
care records for covered entities. (U.S. HIPAA, 2015) 
PHI: personal health information, generally refers to demographic information, medical 
history, test and laboratory results, insurance information and other data collected to identify an 
individual and determine appropriate care. (Kumar & Wambugu, 2015) 
PII: personally identifiable information is information that can be used on its own or with 
other information to identify, contact, or locate a person. (Kissel, 2012) 
Script Kiddie: an unskilled individual who uses scripts or programs developed by others 
to attack computer systems, networks and/or deface websites. (Gregg, n.d.)  
Sweep: scanning computer/digital systems to determine potential weaknesses 
(Chowdhury & Ferdous, 2017) 
System vulnerability: the intersection of three conditions - a susceptible system, an 
attacker with ability to identify weakness, and with capability/motivation to exploit the flaw. 
(Vulnerability Computing, 2016.) 
System weakness: flaws which allow an attacker to exploit vulnerable systems. 
(Vulnerability Computing, 2016.) 









Chapter 2 - Literature Review 
 Current literature on cyber security in mental health tends to address telehealth challenges 
and potential issues vice the motivation of clinicians to implement security measures within their 
practice. The paragraphs which follow focus on the requirement for clinician knowledge, 
motivation, and behavioral intent. The section on Cyber Security Considerations provides a brief 
perspective on the ubiquitous nature of digital systems essential in today’s clinical practices and 
the risk associated with the incomplete understanding of those systems. The following three 
sections provide more specific detail on the theories which underpin the theoretical model for 
this research. First, the section on Threat Perspective describes various hacker sub-types as well 
as the factors which may compel hackers to engage in this type of activity. Notably 
distinguishing the types of relevant threat to a practice is a significant factor in security 
preparation. Second, Family Systems Theories provide insights into the requirements for 
knowledge, threat awareness and enforcement understanding in establishing clinician motivation 
to establish behavioral intent. Third, and finally, the section on Behavioral Intent specifically 
addresses the theoretical constructs used in developing the model for this research. The section 
also details various theoretical approaches used to predict behavioral intent.  
Cyber Security Considerations 
While legal and ethical guidelines mandate the protection of client confidentiality and privacy 
for e-records and in the use of digital systems, many therapists remain uninformed of available 
protections. As a result, while digital capabilities have become essential tools in clinical practice 
and e-records are rapidly becoming the storehouse of choice for many practices, cyber security 
approaches to safeguard those systems remain shadowed in technical jargon and arcane 
processes. Consequently, therapists accept significant risk on behalf of clients, themselves, and 




potentially associates by misunderstanding or in some cases opting out of available protections 
(Aksel, Trung, & Faxvaag, 2005). 
Luxton, McCann, Bush, Mishkind, and Reger (2011) describe the ethical constraints 
associated with the use of smartphone technology in behavioral health. Their assessments of 
threats to smartphone security include both illegal access and loss of devices which compel 
active security measures to prevent data loss under those conditions. Furthermore, while HIPAA 
covers data in transit as described by Hecker and Edwards (2014), other guidelines also provide 
broad instructions on the ethical treatment of client data. Federal Trade Commission (United 
States, FTC, 2010) guidelines and the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical 
Health Act (Secretary H. O., HITECH Act, n. d.) along with many professional standards address 
data privacy and confidentiality for client information. However, implementation guidance, 
standards, and evens laws are non-specific, leaving practitioners to establish their own moral, 
ethical and legal safeguards for cyber security.  
Yet current federal guidelines and professional standards do describe ethical and legal 
requirements to minimize cyber security risk (Kobus, 2015), albeit with broad descriptions of 
requirements vice specifics on implementation standards. The Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act establishes both security and privacy guidelines for covered entities to 
include all those who “…work in healthcare facilities or private offices” (Edemekong & Haydel, 
2019, p. 10).  Requirements identify what obligations covered entities must enact to align 
privacy and security for protected health information (PHI) with HIPAA guidelines. PHI is 
defined as any health information which can disclose the client’s identity (Kumar, M. & 
Wambugu, S.; 2017) and includes any data that may reveal health services, treatment, or 
payment information. Areas such as mandatory electronic and physical requirements are outlined 




within the security rule such that practitioners are assigned responsibility for training personnel, 
encrypting and password protecting information, and conducting security risk audits. While this 
definition necessarily includes both PCI and PII, mechanisms to implement guidance are not 
specified. 
The health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act (HIGHTECH 
Act) provides further insight into business associates as covered entities, notification 
responsibilities if breached, and penalties associated with failure to comply with federal 
mandates. Business associates are defined as an organization or person that works with a covered 
entity but not as a member of the covered entity’s organization (45 CFR 160.103). The Act 
requires the same level of security protections for associates that apply to the health care 
practice.  Additionally, the HIGHTECH Act established rules for notification procedures if a 
breach occurs. The requirement specifies notification of the individual whose information was 
compromised, notification of law enforcement, and notification of state and local media for a 
breach consisting of more than 500 records. Penalties associated with a breach were also 
increased under HIGHTECH and enforcement authorities clarified (Health Information 
Technology Provisions of American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, 2016). Notably, 
the third circuit court of appeals determined the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has the 
authority to enforce cyber security practices to insure alignment with legal mandates (Pardau & 
Edwards, 2017). However, while the FTC continues to determine cyber security deficiencies 
based on both deception and unfairness, specific cyber security implementation standards remain 
to be defined. In that regard, the eleventh circuit court of appeals determined that specific harm 
must be identified before the unfairness codes may be used to compel penalties (Denny, 2016). 
Yet in the absence of legally mandated implementation standards, the FTC retains broad 




authority to determine if cyber security practices are sufficient to insure client protections 
(Pardau & Edwards, 2017). 
In addition to legal requirements albeit with vague, undetermined implementation 
standards, Jordan, Russell, Afousi, Chemel, Mcvicker, Robertson and Winek (2013) assert that, 
“Professional organizations do not provide adequate ethical guidelines for therapeutic practice” 
(p. 105). Further, Jordan, et al. (2013)  state that across all professional mental health 
organizations, “…none provide officially recognized ethical standards for the use of social 
(digital) media in therapeutic practice” (p. 106).  They also emphasize the need to discuss the 
potential risks of a data breach or other compromise with clients to ensure they understand the 
hazards involved with the use of digital media. Consequently, while guidance concerning 
confidentiality and privacy when using digital systems exists, methods and approaches to comply 
with those requirements remains at individual practitioner discretion.  
Finally, Claar (2011) determined that users of digital systems disregard even basic cyber 
security. A finding suggesting that even if legal and ethical guidance on implementation 
standards were developed, clinicians may not have the ability or intent to adopt those standards. 
Consequently, while specifying at least minimum implementation practices would provide 
clarity into expected digital privacy and confidentiality actions, actual execution of cyber 
security may be dependent on additional factors as well.  
Very limited research has been conducted on cyber security for smaller clinical practices 
and virtually no research has been conducted to consider the effects of a clinician’s knowledge of 
cyber security requirements or the factors which influence a therapist’s behavioral intent. Bruch 
and Feinberg (2017) determined that insufficient research has been conducted on risk and 
motivational models for real world conditions. Consequently, no exploratory studies have 




attempted to address the knowledge therapists have of laws and guidelines for digital 
confidentiality, their use of systems and protections to enhance security, nor the therapist’s 
behavioral influences in addressing the risks associated with digital systems in clinical practice. 
As a result, this research was designed to provide insight into the factors which serve to reflect a 
therapist’s knowledge of requirements and those that influence a therapist’s behavioral intentions 
to address the protection of sensitive information and systems in clinical practice. 
Threat Perspective 
A key dynamic for practitioners in assessing the use of cyber security in mental health 
involves the therapist’s understanding of the threat. In cyber terms, a threat consists of two 
equally emphasized areas. First, an adversary must have the capability to inflict harm on a 
system. Second, the adversary must have the motivation to carry out an attack. Many capabilities 
to compromise computer systems can be found on-line and many more can be purchased for 
varying amounts. As a result, since the tools to compromise systems are readily available, 
motivation for hackers is assigned a significant prominence in reviewing cyber security 
operations and establishing protective approaches (Vidalis & Jones, 2005).  
Motivation spans many impulse layers based on the goals of the hacker: Advanced 
Persistent Threats (APTs – hackers working for nation states), criminals, crackers, hacktivists, or 
script kiddies (Leonard, 2013).  However, a consistent set of traits describe many of the members 
of these groups. First, hackers of all varieties tend to be bright, technically adept, and gratified by 
solving challenges. Second, “crackers” are especially characterized as very skilled, over-
qualified, arrogant, and view themselves as “Robin Hoods” of the digital age, taking from the 
rich and giving to the disadvantaged (Goode & Cruise, 2006). Additionally, while all hackers 




commit criminal acts, each subculture retains a distinct code of ethics (Goode, et al., 2006) 
reminiscent of codes established in other groups such as prison populations or gangs.  
Power is yet another hacker motivation. Smyslova and Voiskounsky (2009) describe a 
hacker’s motivation as generating positive feelings of competence and power. Furthermore, as a 
hacker’s skills increase, their ability to solve ever more complex challenges not only continues to 
build their reputation but serves as a positive reinforcement for feelings of worth and 
accomplishment. Fotinger and Ziegler (n.d,) advanced the idea that hackers may be plagued by 
deeply rooted feelings of inferiority. As a result, their skills and abilities to assess system 
weaknesses, identify vulnerabilities and exploit those vulnerabilities may yield a sense of power 
not available to the hacker in other aspects of their lives.    
Hackers commonly group themselves by the intentions of the hacker – white hat, grey 
hat, or black hat (Nikitina, 2012). Furthermore, the same skills used for hacking by attackers are 
used by cyber forensics experts, vulnerability assessment professionals and other government 
and law enforcement experts to defeat cyber-attacks (Fotinger & Ziegler, n.d.). Also, younger 
hackers may begin hacking from a desire to experience a thrill, pursue a challenge or even use 
hacking as an escape. Notably, Swan, (n.d.) addressed the ideology of hackers as deriving from 
an ethical code but based on ambivalence to the law, disdain for legal consequences, and derision 
for the structures that created dysfunctional interpersonal dynamics in their social systems.  
Systems Theory Perspectives 
In regard to relational theories, Symbolic Interactionism (SI) suggests that individuals 
interact based on their ability to connect around a common set of symbols that have recognized 
meaning for the group. Leonard (2013) describes the hacker’s world as forging recognizable 
groups based on dress, virtual locations - signatures, and specifically the “tools of the trade” 




(e.g., laptops, etc.). Yet, mental health therapists also have a lexicon of practice jargon that 
stretches from theoretical to applied language, generally accepted rules for dress, and practice 
settings. Therefore, norms and accepted standards become predictors of member behavior once 
individuals adopt identity within the group. Similarly, learned successful behaviors provide the 
basis for future behaviors although modified by current situations. Consequently, while learned 
behaviors from the standpoint of the hacker revolve around various emotional and/or physical 
rewards, learned behaviors for many clinicians involve accepting the status quo since they have 
not yet been compromised.  Additionally, our definition of a perceived environment is important 
even though there may be a real environment that we do not accept or understand (Boss, 1993). 
The virtual worlds created by and/or infiltrated by hackers provide them with a sense of control 
and power that they often do not possess in their physical environments. All these factors, to 
include a divergence in threat understanding among cyber security and clinical professionals, 
align significantly with the sub-optimal use of risk mitigation techniques in mental health.  
To further complicate the cyber security problem, the symbols and labels used in mental 
health and cyber security or even with the use of digital systems (broader IT terminology), in 
general, are not congruent. In fact, the technical jargon in cyber security is based on a very 
specific set of principles which is part of the professional language of the discipline. 
Consequently, it is difficult to bridge the language gap created by technical descriptions of cyber 
practice with the far more humanist language of mental health. Second, it is also difficult to 
understand the complex technologies associated with unique technical architectures, protection 
systems and assessment capabilities. For example, Guterman and Kirk (1999) observe that the 
ever-changing technological advances in the internet continue to create an entirely new set of 
conditions for social interaction. They assert, from a postmodern perspective, that reality is 




created through society and based on a common language within those interactions. 
Consequently, if therapists are continuously required to learn new conceptual approaches and 
descriptions for digital changes, they may be unable to adapt security practices to those changes 
in meaningful ways. Third, the ever-expanding use of digital systems enables a significant 
increase in professional dialogue for research, education and training, and in the wider delivery 
of clinical services through remote therapy. However, Guterman and Kirk (1999) go on to stress 
that knowledge derives from the synthesis of observations across an entire community of 
participants. This synthesis of experiences across the community of mental health practices 
appears to be absent today. Fourth, and finally, from a social justice perspective, the larger the 
number of contributors to a specific concept, the greater the likelihood that the concept will 
reflect the norms and values of the society as a whole. Consequently, while web services, email 
and other digital systems provide a much richer opportunity to create knowledge for our 
profession and the broader mental health community, those advances also create attack surfaces 
for possible compromise. Of no surprise, Guterman and Kirk (1999) predict that the use of 
digital systems will continue to grow throughout our society, yet the sophistication of the threat, 
the pace of technological change, and a lack of cyber security insights serve to exacerbate 
already complex decision dynamics for non-cyber security professionals. 
In addition to increased dependence on digital systems, many clinicians assume the use of 
these systems is either without risk or only creates small risk to the practice since they have not 
experienced a breach themselves. This false sense of security may arise from a faulty premise – 
why would anyone want to attack my networks as I’m only a small business and not worth 
anyone’s time? That thought process defines a specific kind of risk environment and expected set 
of interactions that do not match the intentions of would-be attackers (Hoffman & Podgurskey, 




2007). In fact, the fewer security features and protections aligned with small businesses make 
them more vulnerable to virtually any hacker skill level (script kiddies – APTs). Therefore, while 
clinicians interpret their digital environment as relatively safe, the reality of risk exposure is 
exactly the opposite (Pfleeger & Caputo, 2012).  
Camp (2006) found “individuals systematically fail to respond to detailed risk 
information in a manner that would be predicted by strict rationality” (p. 2). Her research on 
mental models for reducing risk further suggests that as individuals fail to assess their risks 
effectively, technological solutions will not provide sufficient vulnerability mitigation. 
Consequently, models for effective risk mitigation must evolve to produce change in a clinician’s 
threat awareness, recognition of policy, process, and technological actions, and understanding of 
the mitigating strategies available for use. Those enhancements to understanding may stem from 
employing multiple mental models to achieve change in clinician behaviors.  
Recupero and Rainey (2005) discuss both the risks and benefits of digital media in use by 
clinicians following a forensic model of analysis (e.g., vulnerability + threat = risk). Their initial 
assessment considers the benefits of e-therapy in clinical practice noting that outcomes were 
similar for depressed patients in either face-to-face or e-therapy sessions.  Recupero and Rainey 
(2005) also state that other studies suggested the efficacy of e-therapy in anxiety, loneliness and 
eating disorders. However, their research also identified numerous areas for concern in the use of 
digital media. Problems for clinical evaluation and consequently effective treatment can be 
influenced by patient anonymity, assuring patient identity, and incorrect contact data. Ethical 
concerns include technical problems that produce feelings in the client of apparent clinician 
disinterest. Other ethical issues involve ensuring an acceptable level in the standard of patient 
care – very difficult with the minimal guidelines currently established – and technical concerns 




in automatic intercept and archiving of information by Internet Service Providers (ISPs).  The 
authors also caution that legal implications for e-therapy may be influenced by laws that regulate 
inter-state telemedicine. Finally, the authors confirm, “That even when therapist and patient both 
employ sophisticated technology measures to increase the security of their communications, 
there is no ultimate guarantee of privacy or data security” (Recupero & Rainey, 2005, p. 408).  
Similarly, family theories that consider hierarchies, power and control as central elements 
also intersect with cyber security. For example, systems theory views nature as a layering of 
systems, subsystems, and suprasystems that closely parallel the digital world and its network 
design constructs (Boss, et al., 2009). Additionally, systems theory also introduces the concept of 
“cybernetics’ that incorporates the idea of communication and manipulation of information in 
controlling behaviors (Boss et al., 2009). Digital media were constructed to facilitate 
communication and manipulate data to enhance human connectivity and allow rapid access to 
information.   
Abawajy (2012) highlights human factors as a major contributor to risk mitigation in his 
description of cyber security as the, “…comprehension that users have about the importance of 
information security best practices” (p. 237).    His research emphasized the legal requirements 
for Payment Card Industry (PCI) Data Security Standards for anyone accepting credit card 
payments and the training requirements associated with that guidance.  In fact, Abawajy (2012) 
found that multiple delivery methods for cyber training enhanced communication and retention 
of cyber security best practices and provided essential reinforcement of learning for risk 
mitigation. 
Finally, social justice theory incorporates the concept of a social contract as one basis for 
moral and ethical interaction in society (Capehart & Milovanovic, 2007). Within that concept, 




the implied or in some instances the explicit contract between client and clinician includes the 
mandate to “do no harm”. That requirement includes the clinician’s responsibility to defend 
against the potential compromise of client information from a lack of cyber security awareness or 
poor implementation of cyber policy, process, and technology. Hydari, Telang, and Marella 
(2015) advance the thought that higher levels of patient data security and confidentiality are 
enabled by the use of electronic health records but also conclude that Patient Safety Events 
(PSEs), including data breaches or other Information Technology (IT) lapses, “affect hundreds of 
thousands of patients in the U.S. and cost billions of dollars” (p. 31). However, they also 
identified that in Pennsylvania Hospitals, those that had adopted e-record protocols experienced 
a 27% decline in PSEs over the measurement period with additional improvements in reducing 
medication errors. As a result, the move to more sustained use of digital systems is likely to 
increase with a commensurate responsibility for clinicians to attain greater understanding of 
cyber security to fulfill the digital privacy and confidentiality contract with their clients.  
Digital Practice in Mental Health Theoretical Support 
Fernandez-Aleman, Senor, Lozoya, and Toval (2013) describe security and privacy 
concerns in using digital systems which also suggest a need for clinician action in securing client 
Personal Health Information (PHI), Personally Identifying Information (PII) and Personal Credit 
Information (PCI). They suggest that the use of e-records exposes client data to a wide number 
of administrative, financial, and other staff who should not have access to that information. 
Furthermore, their study showed that multiple layers of cyber security action provide the highest 
degree of risk mitigation for clients and practitioners. Sweeney (2002) suggests a specific 
anonymity technique (k-Anonymity) which incorporates physical characteristics and other 
identifying information as a substitution approach in identifying clients. Her methodology 




enables increased client privacy protection through the use of unique personal characteristics 
combined with identifiers (e.g., a client’s zip code, etc.) to establish client identification without 
the use of or reference to names when using digital systems. Similarly, Barrows and Clayton 
(1996) assess cyber security options in maintaining access while mitigating the risks of a digital 
compromise. Their model recommends a recognition of how digital systems will be used to meet 
operational needs, what threats are likely to be encountered and how to secure systems in light of 
those factors.  
Finally, the social contract with clients and the broad guidelines established by federal, state, 
local, and tribal governing bodies as well as the lack of specific standards promulgated by 
professional organizations creates a confusing and uncertain terrain for clinicians to navigate 
(Kobus, 2015). However, risk mitigation approaches and accepting responsibility for maintaining 
client privacy and confidentiality are not options. In fact, they are essential elements in 
maintaining client trust.  
Behavioral Intent Theories on Motivation and Risk 
Motivation and risk models have been developed for a wide range of human behavior, yet none 
have been specifically adapted to study the factors which may influence a therapist’s cyber 
security behavioral intentions. Consequently, significant factors were extracted from open 
systems theory, expansive learning theory, general deterrence theory, control theory, social 
control theory, social learning theory, the theory of planned behavior, and the risk homeostasis, 
and TRIRISK models. These factors represented the practitioner’s knowledge of laws and ethical 
guidelines, self-efficacy in implementing protective measures, understanding of threat intent and 
capabilities, the norms for adhering to typical security practices within the mental health 
community, and the recognition of the impact penalties may have for non-compliance. The 




selected factors (Figure 1) emerged as a potential predictive design to describe the areas 
influencing a therapist’s understanding of cyber security requirements (knowledge) and 
behavioral intent in enacting cyber security within a practice. 
Figure 1 
Influence Factors and Behavioral Intent Model 
 
Although mental health clinical practices are, by definition, organizations designed to 
facilitate the delivery of treatment for clients with mental health and/or relational concerns, each 
practice is organized to provide specific services to clients and is therefore optimized around 
delivery of those services. However, general structures which enable service delivery, remain 
relatively constant across clinical practices (e.g., client health records, invoicing, informed 
consent documents, etc.). Yet, practices are also tailored to match the unique preferences of the 
practice owner or the environmental, legal, or ethical mandates of the practice location, clientele, 
or business model. As a result, organizational psychology in general, and open systems theory 
specifically, provide some perspectives surrounding the influences which may contribute to 
understanding the motivation of practitioners in adopting or dismissing intentions to address 
cyber security options within private practice. Notably, in open systems theory, three 
influencing, normative motivational areas are needed for organizations to function effectively: 




awareness of “environmental pressures generated by the direct, observable requirements of a 
given situation, shared values and expectations, and rule enforcement (Katz & Kahn, 1978).” 
Therefore, the environmental pressures created by the use of digital systems in clinical practice 
aligned with an ever-increasing threat would be predicted to elicit a practitioner’s decision to 
implement cyber security within the practice. Similarly, Herath and Rao (2009) determined that 
perceptions of the likelihood of a breach, social-organizational norms and the availability of 
resources are significant factors in decisions to adopt cyber security within an organization. 
However, while practitioners are exposed to news and other media reporting on cyber breaches 
at an increasing rate, most practices have neither been hacked nor even know of a hack firsthand. 
Consequently, the “direct, observable” aspect of the requirement may not be met (van Schaik, et 
al., 2016) 
Second, although mental health therapists share ethical intentions concerning 
confidentiality and privacy, the unique ingredients for adopting cyber security may remain 
motivations at an individual, not shared, level and be more effected by risk tolerance than shared 
values. Awareness, then, may not be sufficient to compel action. In a study of German nationals’ 
motivational processes, Scholl, M., Fuhrmann, and Scholl, L. (2018) suggested that educational 
programs would benefit students by including digital security as part of core programs to help 
individuals begin to develop a sense of responsibility and intentionality for cyber security. In 
keeping with Vygotsky’s “zone of proximal development” (individual problem-solving versus 
learning from others), Engeström and Sannino (2009) provided insights into expansive learning 
theory that suggest that during times of significant change (e.g., rapid technological advance), 
disciplines are not completely mastered. Learning the intricacies of cyber security as a 
subcomponent of overall Information Technology (IT) fits this theoretical interpretation. This 




perspective further suggests that dedicated focus on cyber security may be required to provide 
learning in how to secure digital systems effectively. Nevertheless, Carver and Scheier (1982) 
demonstrated that exposing individuals to specific schema make the ability to access actionable 
areas more available when needed if an effective feedback loop was also available. The catalyst 
for such a feedback loop may be influenced by the accepted norms established within a 
profession. The resulting message implies that cyber security motivation could be addressed 
through learned focus on individual responsibility as contributing to a shared value and with a 
realization that cyber security must be an inseparable component of any ethically sound business 
model (Boss, et al., 2009).  
Third, and finally, although Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
(HIPPA), Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act (HITECH), 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC), and other federal, state and local laws require protection for 
personal information (e.g., Personally Identifying Information (PII), Personal Credit Information 
(PCI), Personal Health Information (PHI)), how those protections are implemented remains at 
the discretion of a practitioner population unfamiliar with the methods of creating effective 
security protocols (Hecker & Edwards, 2014; United States, Department of Health and Human 
Services, The Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology, 2015; 
Secretary, H. O. HITECH Act Enforcement Interim Final Rule, n.d.; United States, Federal 
Trade Commission, Bureau of Consumer Protection, 2010). Furthermore, enforcement of legal 
standards continues to be inconsistent and audits only effect a small percentage of organizations. 
Highlighting this disconnect, Boss, et al., (2009), stress the importance of monitoring activities 
for compliance if organizational motivation is to be encouraged. Through this lens, the three 
requirements to establish an effectively operating organizational structure appear to be violated 




when considering factors which could influence a therapist’s intentions to incorporate cyber 
security decision making into clinical practice.  
 Many theories of motivation draw on the work of Bandura (Ajzen, 2002), especially in 
his discussion of self-efficacy. While an individual’s specific actions or behaviors may not 
reflect confidence in completing the steps within an overall project, the individual’s lack of 
confidence that executing the specific steps will create the desired conditions certainly effects 
their willingness to engage in the activities (Dwivedi, Rana, Anand, Clement & Williams, 2017). 
With a focus on cyber security, perceived self-efficacy would suggest that clinicians may 
struggle with multiple aspects of project control. For example, as attackers have more technical 
sophistication than most clinicians, attempts to technically control the digital environment may 
appear futile (locus of control). Furthermore, the clinician may also perceive that despite 
significant effort, the end state of those efforts may still not produce cyber security. The theory 
of planned behavior describes self-efficacy, perceived behavioral control, and locus of control in 
just this way: the recognition that even best efforts may not create the desired result leads to a 
decision to reject an action (Ajzen, 2002; Armitage & Conner, 2001). 
 Lee, S. M., Lee, S., and Yoo (2003) describe motivation for internal cyber security by 
combining elements of general deterrence theory (GDT) and social control theory (SCT). 
Research in these areas indicates that organizational focus of attention creates motivational 
influences that produce individual responsibility for cyber security. Lee, et al., (2003) describe 
GDT as involving an emphasis on security actions, while four areas comprise SCT: Attachment 
(affection for others), Commitment (investment in societal values), Involvement (dedicated 
time), and Norms (acceptance of traditional values). These SCT areas focus on an individual’s 
connection to others within the organization and loyalty to the organization itself. In that context, 




a professional organization’s involvement in establishing focused, enforceable requirements for 
licensed practitioners may advance cyber security actions throughout the profession. Indeed, 
creating a professional commitment focused on expected cyber security behavioral norms may 
be important in motivating practitioner action to secure information and systems. 
While social control theory focuses on the significance of social connections to affect 
behavior, control theory emphasizes a difference between strong and weak bonds within a 
system – predictive of choices an individual may make based on self-interest. Carver and Scheier 
(1982) suggest control theory (CT) as a mechanism for understanding human decision-making 
processes. With broad applicability for cyber security decision making, CT emphasis on systems 
dynamics and feedback loops is especially noteworthy. In CT, “perception, comparison of the 
perception with a standard, behavioral output, and the effect of the behavior on the environment” 
(Carver & Scheier, 1982, p. 112) serve to provide structure for understanding influential 
motivations and judgement in the intention-decision process. In cyber security, a clinician’s 
perception of the security of the practice’s digital systems and the likelihood of a compromise 
may establish the conditions to create a negative feedback loop surrounding additional required 
protections for confidentiality and privacy. Similarly, comparing that perception to others within 
the mental health field, may move the clinician to a perspective of being within the standard of 
practice for the profession. However, as discussed under the theory of planned behavior 
(Madden, Ellen & Ajzen, 1992) and reinforced here in control theory, an expectation that a more 
effective outcome may not be the result of changed behavior and recognition that change in 
action may not produce reduced risk, both serve to reinforce a status quo motivational construct.   
Also, West (2008) confirms this process in his discussion of “risk homeostasis”. In his 
research, as people implement greater security, they engaged in riskier behaviors.  Additionally, 




individuals may believe they are at less risk than others, regardless of the security they have in 
place and although intellectually people understand the risk and implications of compromise - 
belief that others are more vulnerable militates against adopting greater security measures. 
Finally, safety and security are abstract with an uncertain amount of value while costs to 
establish effective cyber protections are concrete. Consequently, when people calculate the 
relative value of loss and gain, assured loss (cost to implement protection) is weighted more 
heavily (Chronopoulos, Panaousis, & Grossklags, 2018). 
Ferrer, Klein, Avishai, Jones, Villegas, and Sheeran (2018) discuss the idea of risk 
perception in motivation. Employing a TRIRISK model comprised of deliberative (reasoned 
judgements), affective (feelings), and experiential (heuristic) perception, the authors examined 
risk decision processes based on self-protective assessments to mitigate a health threat. While not 
a direct comparison to systems risk decisions, the results provide an intriguing parallel within a 
risk-reward, cost-consequence context. Notably, fear becomes less meaningful as a motivational 
element as the threat increases. Consequently, although the risk of compromise for digital 
systems continues to escalate, from these research findings, the threat alone would not be 
expected to generate an intention to act to combat the challenge of a potential breach.  
  




Chapter 3 - Methods and Procedures 
This study was designed to identify factors that influence the intentions of mental health 
therapists to address cyber security in clinical practice. Specifically, the question researched was, 
Do the following factors serve to influence a therapist’s behavioral intentions to address the 
protection of sensitive information and systems in clinical practice?: (a) knowledge of laws and 
ethical guidelines, (b) self-efficacy in implementing protective measures, (c) understanding of 
threat intent and capabilities, (d) the norms for adhering to typical security practices within the 
mental health community, (e) the recognition of the impact penalties may have for non-
compliance.  Information was collected using a modified questionnaire based on previously 
validated instruments.  
Research Design 
Notably, representative surveys have been constructed to provide broad insights into 
relevant areas of motivation (Herath & Rao, 2009; Rhee, Kim, & Ryu, 2009; S. Boss, Kirsch, 
Angermeier, Shingler & R. Boss, 2009) but none specifically designed to address cyber security 
practices within the mental health arena. Also, the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST) (Swanson, 2001) developed surveys which provide a broad, generalized 
multi-industry standard but again without direct focus on mental health. The survey developed 
for this study was also created with an understanding of generalized industry level studies but 
modified to reflect the probable uses of digital capabilities and systems within mental health 
clinical practice. The survey was designed to determine a clinician’s knowledge of cyber security 
requirements, gain an understanding of their use of digital systems in practice, assess the factors 
influencing behaviors, and the clinician’s intentions for protecting data, information, and 
information systems themselves. The research instrument was submitted to the St. Mary’s 




University Institutional Review Board and piloted to insure content validity and clarity of the 
survey questions. The validation group consisted of mental health therapists drawn from private 
practice: individual, small group, and larger institutions. Revisions to questions were reviewed 
by the author to determine the sufficiency of required modifications and face validity. Once 
developed, piloted and adjusted for language and understandability of terms, the survey was 
advertised through multiple state and professional mental health membership sites. The 
advertisement contained a link to the survey (Appendix A) enabling participants to complete the 
instrument while remaining anonymous. Results of the survey were intended to extend our 
knowledge of cyber security practices within the mental health community, the factors which 
influence cyber security actions, and the way those factors affect the therapists’ intentions to 
address cyber security within clinical settings. Furthermore, the survey responses also 
established initial information on threat awareness and clinician motivation to address cyber 
security requirements established by legal mandates and professional codes of ethics.  
Participants 
In collecting data relevant to mental health practitioners’ intended processes for 
addressing cyber security in clinical practice, it was important to clearly define the sample 
population. Therefore, since clinicians are either fully licensed members of the mental health 
community or associate/intern members, and since associate/intern members must be supervised, 
decisions for incorporating cyber security into clinical practice may appear to fall to those who 
are fully licensed. However, both associates and interns are licensed professionals (albeit at a 
provisional level) and are therefore ultimately responsible for client confidentiality, privacy, and 
the integrity of the electronic capabilities (data and systems) they use. As a result, a composite, 
convenience sample population for this study consisted of all licensed practitioners whether fully 




or provisionally licensed. Furthermore, as MFTs, counselors, and counseling psychologists are 
largely representative of the broader mental health profession, the study may also be of use to 
other mental health providers, and in fact, to those within the cyber security community whose 
interests and responsibilities extend to the mental health field. 
Participants were recruited through state professional organizations. Initially, state 
organizations were selected through identification of states with the highest numbers of mental 
health providers. States were also selected across regional areas to establish a representative 
cross section of marriage and family therapists, counselors, and psychologists throughout the 
United States. Based on the numbers of questions in the survey, states continued to be contacted 
until the number of completed surveys provided an ability to generalize research findings. 
Research participants who completed the survey were able to access an author developed Risk 
Assessment template following submission of their answers as incentive to complete the 
instrument.  
Model Design 
 Sarstedt, Ringle, and Hair (2017) suggested two stages in evaluating the model design 
and the structural and predictive elements of the instrument in a SmartPLS structural equation 
model (SEM). Stage one addresses the theoretical underpinnings for the model itself while stage 
two concerns developing insight into the instrument’s structural and predictive dynamics. 
Additionally, when both reflective and formative indicators comprise the model different, yet 
specific tests are required to test the model’s strength and predictive abilities. For reflective 
elements within the composite model, indicator reliability, internal consistency, and discriminant 
validity were examined. For composite model formative factors, determining acceptable outer 




weights, outer loadings when necessary (e.g., if outer weights were low), model bias, and 
collinearity were important. Finally, model fit was established using SRMR data.  
Stage one examination of the theoretical basis for the new model was accomplished 
through comparison with existing models and instruments. Instrument factors were initially 
selected based on relevant theories of motivation to include: open systems theory (awareness of 
environmental pressures that are directly observed, shared values and expectations, rule 
enforcement) -  expansive learning theory (with significant change, disciplines not completely 
mastered) – general deterrence theory (actions aligned with penalties) - social control theory 
(attachment, commitment, involvement, norms) – control theory (strong vs weak system bonds) 
– theory of planned behavior (expectation of results) – risk homeostasis (greater security 
produces riskier behavior, scale reduces risk of compromise) – TRIRISK model (reasoned 
judgement, feelings, experience). However, knowledge was also included as a factor since 
knowledge of requirements, capabilities, threats, others’ actions (norms), and consequences for 
inaction (penalties) are requirements for effective motivation and behavior determination.  
Instrument Design 
To enable collection of data that allows for an assessment of motivational influences and 
clinician intentions, a practitioner-cyber security measurement instrument was developed. 
Instrument indicators were designed by aligning questionaire language with questions similar to 
those developed by Herath and Rao (2009), Rhee, Kim, and Ryu (2009), and S. Boss, et al., 
(2009). In addition, the author developed new behavioral intent questions patterned after the 
theory of planned behavior (TpB) design established by Ajzen (2002). The result is a modified, 
study specific, survey instrument. Questions were designed with either semantic (nominal) or 
scaled (ordinal) responses. Semantic responses were: Yes, No, I don’t know, while scaled 




responses employed a five point Likert scale. Additionally, the survey was piloted (Cronbach’s 
alpha = .912) to identify any necessary structural modifications and further verify content 
validity, construct validity and reliability. 
Definitional consistency was maintained throughout the instrument design and 
modification processes by comparison with existing surveys (Herath & Rao, 2009; Rhee, et al., 
2009; S. Boss, et al., 2009; van Deursen & Van Dijk, 2010; Swanson, 2001) and construction 
methods (Ajzen, 2002). Variables were operationalized across survey sections representing the 
potential influencing factors and behavioral actions. Using similar sentence structure to the 
Herath and Rao (2009) design approach, behavioral intent (BHI) was derived from questions 
concerning the perceived likelihood of a compromise, severity of a compromise, a clinician’s 
concerns of a compromise and the ability of the clinician to take effective cyber security action 
(BHI questions 15 – 17, 20 – 22, 29 – 32, 39 – 42, 49 – 52, and 58 – 61). Attitude questions were 
used to determine a therapist’s perspective on security policy and effectiveness if actions were 
taken (questions 15, 16, 19, 22, 26, 38, 40, 42, 43, 48, 49, 50, 51, 55,56, 60, and 61). To measure 
awareness of requirements, knowledge of legal and ethical regulations (questions 12 – 14 and 
18) and expected enforcement of policies (penalties; questions 53 – 57) were included. The 
effect of norms (questions 43 – 48) for influencing intentions was addressed through questions 
on both subjective and descriptive norms. Self-efficacy (questions 23 – 28) incorporated 
questions on a therapist’s facility in recognizing and implementing cyber security options in the 
context of operational vulnerabilities. Threat awareness (questions 33 – 38) was covered by 
questions on both threat sophistication and threat intentionality 





 Materials consist of an approximately 60 item survey accessible through an anonymous 
Qualtrics link, advertising information, and an author developed cyber security risk assessment 
template. Item and structural analyses were performed using both SPSS and SmartPLS statistical 
programs.   
Procedures 
The survey consists of 60 multiple-choice, scaled, and semantic questions surrounding 
the factors that may influence a therapist’s intentions to enact cyber security within their clinical 
practice in accordance with published guidance (e.g., law and ethical codes). After subtracting 
demographic questions, approximately 200 completed responses were desired to provide 
sufficient power to enable generalization of results. The instrument itself along with additional 
required research information specifics, were submitted to the St. Mary’s University Institutional 
Review Board (IRB) for approval and authority to conduct the research.  Following IRB 
approval, the survey was pilot tested to insure clarity of question intent and understandability of 
language and terms. Required adjustments were incorporated and the resulting modifications 
assessed by the author. No major revisions were required, and the survey was promulgated for 
data collection. The final survey instrument was loaded onto the Qualtrics website and the access 
link transmitted to state professional organizations for advertisement to their members. 
Therapists accessed the instrument anonymously through the advertised link. Responses were 
then extracted from Qualtrics for analysis and manipulation in the selected statistical programs 
(e.g., SPSS, SmartPLS). 





 The purpose of this research was to describe mental health practitioners’ current cyber 
security knowledge, practices, and the behavioral intentions influencing a therapist’s 
implementation of cyber security within clinical mental health settings. Factors for the study 
were determined through a review of current systems, behavioral, and motivation theories then 
selected based on expected relevance to actual clinical practices. The research explored the 
factors of knowledge, self-efficacy, threat awareness, norms, and penalties. The specific research 
question was: What factors serve to influence a therapist’s behavioral intentions to address the 
protection of sensitive information and systems in clinical practice? Consequently, the research 
design was constructed to provide insight into the significance and strength of each factor on a 
clinician’s behavioral intent. Research hypotheses tested included: 
H1:  Practitioners with greater knowledge of legal and ethical requirements to protect 
sensitive information and systems will adopt precautions  
H2: Practitioners with higher perceptions of self-efficacy will take greater direct 
precautions to protect sensitive information and digital systems 
H3: Therapists with greater insight into the severity of the potential threat will enact more 
digital security protections.  
H4: A therapist’s commitment to protecting sensitive information/systems will be 
increased by their perception of compliance by other practitioners. 
H5:  Practitioners who believe penalties will be associated with non-compliance of cyber 
security rules will take precautions to protect sensitive information. 
The results of data analysis were expected to show that therapists believe they understand 
the requirements for confidentiality established by federal and state law (H1). Additionally, 




therapists with a greater sense of self-efficacy were expected to take more precautions to address 
cyber security risk (H2). Similarly, therapists with minimal awareness of the potential severity 
posed by cyber threats (H3), may believe they do not have the ability to create a meaningful 
difference in addressing risk. Additionally, those therapists that perceive their peers as fulfilling 
the guidance specified in law and ethical codes may be more likely to conduct appropriate 
measures to defend sensitive information and information systems from attack (H4).  Finally, 
those therapists that believe processes are in place to enforce the standards required by law and 
ethical codes may be motivated by the potential penalties associated with non-compliance (H5). 
Statistical Methods and Analysis  
In stage two, the finalized composite research model was assessed for structural and predictive 
sufficiency. Several researchers (Kock, N. 2017; Becker, Klein, & Wetzels, 2012; Lowry & 
Gaskin, 2014; Hair, Sarstedt, Hopkins & Kuppleweiser, 2014) reported the strength of structural 
equation modeling (SEM) and partial least squares (PLS) in behavioral investigation and 
predictive analysis. Consequently, PLS – SEM was determined to be an effective method for 
analyzing the resulting survey data. In that regard, SmartPLS software enabled insights into both 
structural and path analysis to determine the significance of formative factor variables on the 
reflective behavioral intent variable. Standard default SmartPLS settings were used, with the 
exception of 5000 sub samples in bootstrapping, to create analytic insights and to ensure data 
elements reflected acceptable structural and predictive results.  
Face validity was established through direct observation and comparison with existing 
models (Herath & Rao, 2009; Rhee, et a;., 2009: S. Boss, et al., 2009; Ajzen, 2002). Internal 
consistency was established using Cronbach’s alpha and composite reliability. Composite 
reliability also confirmed construct validity (Hair, Sarstedt, Hopkins, & Kupplweiser, 2014).  




Discriminant validity for reflective factors was assessed using the preferred Heterostat – 
Monostat method where a value less than .9 indictes acceptable discriminant validity (Henseler, 
Ringle, & Sarstedt, 2014). Content validity was determined through expert examination of 
factors and indicators and convergent validity was not assessed for the composite model (Lowry 
& Gaskin, 2014). However, convergent validity was recommended to be assessed using 
individual factor analysis for each formative factor pathway – Knowledge to Knowledge 
behavioral intent (BHI), Self-efficacy to Self-efficacy BHI, etc. where a 0.5 path score is 
considered acceptable (Carlson & Herdman, 2012; Wong, 2013; Sarstedt, Ringle & Hair, 2017, 
p. 28). 
In formative models, indicators define different aspects of a factor, therefore typical 
measurements for structural integrity are not considered conceptually valid (Lowry & Gaskin, 
2014). Similarly, outer loadings, except as needed to assess outer weights that fall below 
accepted values, and average variance extracted are also irrelevant for formative factor variables 
(Wong, 2013, p. 14).  However, Wong (2013) also asserted that measuring inner model 
relationships, outer model weights, and collinearity were necessary assessments for models with 
at least one formative factor. Finally, Hussain, Fangwei, Siddiqi, Ali, and Shabbir (2018) 
proposed that for an outer model (e.g., the structural components of the model), reliability is 
measured by assessing results from the entire composite survey instrument as opposed to 
individual factor analysis. 
As a result, both factor and path analyses were used to understand the structural 
effectiveness and predictive power (e.g., significance and strength) of independent latent 
variables on the dependent variable of behavioral intent (BHI). Structural assessment was 
conducted using a combination of the Lowry and Gaskin (2014), Wong (2013), Sarstedt, Ringle, 




and Hair (2017), and Hussain, Fangwei, Siddiqi, Ali, and Shabbir (2018) methods. Path 
coefficients, t-scores, f2, and R2 were used to determine the predictive significance of 
relationships and the strength of factor impact (Wong, 2013).  
Outer model weights were assessed with t-scores of 1.96 considered as acceptable 
(Lowry & Gaskin, 2014; Wong, 2013). However, for indicators with t-scores below 1.96, 
comparison with outer loadings above 0.4 was used to determine item significance (Sarstedt, 
Ringle, & Hair, 2017). Factor loadings and weights appear in Appendix B, tables B1 and B2 
respectively. Following that review, indicators 18, 24, 29 (Knowledge); 33, 35, 36 (Threat); 45, 
47 (Norms); and 53, 54, 55 (Penalties) were initially removed from the model. However, 
individual item removal and model testing did not reflect increased model strength. Therefore, 
all indicators were allowed to remain within the model (Sarstedt, et al., 2017).  
Formative factor multicollinearity was evaluated through assessing variance inflation 
factors (VIF) where values below 10 are acceptable and below 3.3 defined as rigorous and model 
fit was evaluated using SRMR below 0.08 desired. Survey results were also compared with 
government established cyber security best practices (U.S. NIST, 2014)  but evaluated through a 
lens of mental health clinical practice. Finally, demographic survey questions were used as 










Chapter IV – Results 
The purpose of this research was to describe mental health practitioners’ current cyber 
security knowledge, practices and the behavioral intentions influencing a therapist’s 
implementation of cyber security within clinical mental health settings. As a result, the research 
explored the factors which serve to reflect a therapist’s understanding of legal and ethical 
mandates and behavioral intentions to protect sensitive information and systems in clinical 
practice. Knowledge of laws and ethical guidelines, self-efficacy in implementing protective 
measures, understanding of threat intent and capabilities, the norms for adhering to typical 
security practices within the mental health community, and the recognition of the impact 
penalties may have for non-compliance comprise the areas studied. The specific research 
question was: What factors serve to influence a therapist’s behavioral intentions to address the 
protection of sensitive information and systems in clinical practice? Potential factors were 
identified through investigating earlier research on motivation and particularly research into 
cyber security motivational constructs then compared to theoretical models predictive of 
behavioral intent. Social learning theory, open systems theory, control theory, social control 
theory, and the theory of planned behavior emphasize the effects of norms in establishing 
behavioral intent while expansive learning theory, general deterrence theory, and the theory of 
planned behavior predict self-efficacy as an essential factor. Also, open systems theory, general 
deterrence theory, and the TRIRISK model stress the importance of knowledge, penalties, and 
threat awareness respectively. Factors and behavioral intent questions for inclusion in the study 
were then developed to align with representative practice dynamics (e.g., use of electronic 
medical records, computer-based communication systems, etc.). Hypotheses were examined 
through analysis of model results using structural equation modeling (e.g., SmartPLS) while 




theoretical results were assessed through an evaluation of specific questions matched to their 
theoretical constructs. Finally, data collection was concluded after more than 300 participants 
accessed the survey resulting in 210 completed responses.   
Results of the study indicated that although practitioners believe they have the requisite 
knowledge to address cyber security within their practice, inconsistencies in their understanding 
of implementation responsibilities create gaps in protecting client confidentiality and privacy. 
Similarly, clinicians also reported they are not confident in conducting required risk assessments, 
have little understanding or awareness of the threat, and fail to expect consequences for non-
compliance behaviors. Furthermore, although clinicians anticipate professional organizations and 
colleagues expect compliance with laws and ethical mandates, clinicians also believe specified 
standards are not being followed. The contradictions visible in these study results suggest a 
significant level of confusion among clinicians as they attempt to adhere to legal and ethical 
guidance without the ability to implement security practices, the awareness of cyber security 
threat conditions, nor a recognition of the consequences for practitioner inaction.  and 
motivation.  
Sample Description 
The study included Marriage and Family Therapists, Counselors, and Psychologists in clinical 
practice. Participants were contacted through their specific professional organizations and 
advertisement for the anonymous survey Qualtrics link was announced in accordance with the 
professional organization’s guidelines (e.g., email, website, Facebook, etc.). Although more than 
300 surveys were initiated, 210 (n=210) surveys were completed and submitted. Potential 
reasons for unfinished surveys include a respondent’s perception of failing to answer questions 
correctly, length of the survey resulting in a longer time commitment than anticipated, and 




interruptions which required immediate attention, then not returning to complete the survey. As 
partial surveys may not have reflected accurately on descriptive factor or behavioral intent 
responses based on the distribution of questions throughout the instrument, partial surveys were 
not included in the data assessment. Therefore, only the completed and submitted surveys were 
included in the final data analysis. 
Demographic Data  
Of the final completed surveys, 69% were completed by Marriage and Family Therapists, 27.8% 
were completed by Counselors, and 6.2% were completed by Psychologists (Table 1). 
Additionally, although 110 professional organizations were contacted across 40 states, only 30 
organizations agreed to advertise the survey link while others cited professional guidelines as 
rationale for refusing the request. After several months and repeated contact with those 
organizations which provided support, a sufficient sample of clinicians was obtained. Of the 
survey respondents, 69.5% reported being female and 30% male with 1 person deciding to select 
“prefer not to answer.” Also, the majority of participants (87.1 %) identified themselves as 
located in an urban practice while 12.9% defined their practice as being rural. Most participants 
selected  southern (57.6%) and mid-western (19.5%) regions as their practice location and 
notably, the highest percentages of responding practitioners reported having 21 or more years in 
practice (31%) followed by less than five years of practice experience (24.3%) and 6 – 10 years 










Descriptive Statistics  
  
  Count  Percent    Count  Percent 
Gender      Geographic Region   
 
 
     Male  63  30.0       East  14 
 
6.7 
     Female  146  69.5       South  121 
 
57.6 
Primary Location           Midwest  14 
 
19.5 
     Urban  183  87.1       West  34 
 
16.2 
     Rural  27  12.9  Professional Alignment   
 
 
Years in Practice           Psychologist  13 
 
6.2 
     <5  51  24.3       Counselor  52 
 
27.8 
     6-10  31  14.8       MFT  145 
 
69.0 
     11-15  26  12.4  Highest Level of Education   
 
 
     16-20  8  3.8       Masters  136 
 
65.0 
     11-15       26  12.4       Doctorate  74 
 
35.0 
     16-20         8  3.8  License Category   
 
 
     21+       18  8.6       Fully Licensed  182 
 
86.7 
           Provisional  28 
 
13.3 
Note: n=210           
 
Composite Model Results - Structural Analysis (Outer Model) 
Lowry and Gaskin (2014) provide rationale to clarify the determination of formative 
versus reflective variables. Their discussion emphasizes the requirement for formative indicators 
to align as factors which produce or define a construct. As a result, they then state, “The concepts 
of construct validity and reliability, therefore, do not apply to formative constructs” (p. 15). 
However, construct validity and reliability are important for reflective constructs. As the selected 
research model contains formative and reflective factors, multiple tests were performed to ensure 
the structural integrity and predictive ability of the instrument. Formative indicators consisted of 




questions associated with each factor (e.g., knowledge, self-efficacy, norms, threat, and 
penalties) while reflective indicators were associated with the factor designated as behavioral 
intent (BHI). Arrows pointing from indicators to factors establish formative relationships. 
Arrows pointing from the factor to indicators display reflective constructs.  
Internal consistency 
  Survey questions were piloted using representative clinicians. The initial piloted survey 
consisted of 71 nominal and scaled questions. Resulting internal reliability (Cronbach’s alpha = 
0.912) and dialogue with pilot participants indicated excellent question clarity and content. 
However, additional feedback revealed the survey required an average of 20 – 25 minutes to 
complete. As a result, survey questions were reduced to enable instrument completion within 15 
minutes by removing a motivational factor-behavioral intent section (e.g., resource availability) 
to be assigned for future research. The internal consistency of the final version of the scale was 
determined to be acceptable with Cronbach’s alpha at 0.873.  In addition, internal consistency of 
final scale items was assessed using SmartPLS composite reliability.  Composite reliability 
(0.883, p<0.000) confirmed Cronbach’s alpha measurements for internal consistency. 
Construct Validity 
 While the composite model is not measured for convergent validity, convergent validity 
was assessed by examining individual constructs within the model (Sarstedt, et al., 2017). Each 
factor was aligned to its specific Behavioral Intent indicators (e.g., Knowledge, Norms, 
Penalties, Self-efficacy, Threat, aligned with their specific Behavioral Intent factors (Figures 4 - 
13). Formative factor content validity was determined through comparison with previously 
developed instruments (Herath, et al, 2009; Rhee, et al, 2009; Boss, et al, 2009; Ajzen, 2002).  




Indicator item question stems are listed in Table 2 with stems from previously developed 
instruments included for comparison.  
  






Content Validity of Formative Factors 
 
Formative Factors, BHI 
Items 
 Herath & Rao (2013) 
Items 
 Rhee, et al. (2013) 
Items 
 Boss et al. (2013) 
Items 
Knowledge       
  Knowledge reduces 
compromise risk… 
    Policies are 
available… 
    I will learn more about 
information security 
…(BHI) 
    I am familiar 
with guidelines 
and policies … 
   I review cyber security 
practices… (BHI) 
    I follow security 
policies…(BHI) 
      I am required to 
know 
procedures… 
   Knowledge enables me 
to comply…(BHI) 
    Adopting security is 
important…(BHI) 
    
       
Self-efficacy       
   I feel confident in my 
skills… 
    I would be able to 
follow policies… 
    I feel confident in 
protecting… 
    Employees can 
make a 
difference… 
   I can make a 
difference… 
    Adopting policies are 
important… 
 How often do you check 
security…(BHI) 
    I secure my 
system…(BHI) 
   I will take steps…(BHI)     If I wanted to, I could 
follow policies…(BHI) 
    I will enforce 
procedures…(BHI) 
        
       
Norms       
   My organization thinks 
I should follow … 
    I am expected to help 
this organization… 
 Not addressed     Security takes 
too much time… 
   My colleagues think I 
should… 
    My colleagues think I 
should follow 
security… 
      There is an 
understanding I 
will comply… 
   I intend to comply 
with…(BHI) 
    I am certain I will 
follow security 
rules…(BHI) 
      It is expected I 
will take an active 
role… 
Threat       
   I believe information is 
susceptible… 
 Not addressed     Threats to information 
are controllable… 
    I believe 
information is 
vulnerable… 
   Threats are 
controllable… 
      There exists means to 
control threats… 
    How likely will a 
security violation 
cause… 
   I plan to 
understand…(BHI) 
        I keep aware of 
the latest 
threats…(BHI) 
Penalties       
   There are penalties for 
breaking rules… 
     Computer practices 
are monitored… 
 Not addressed     Managers 
evaluate security 
behaviors… 
   I will take action to 
reduce risk…(BHI) 
    Organization 
disciplines employees 
who break rules… 
        I pay attention 
to computer 
security…(BHI)  
     I am likely to 
follow…(BHI) 
    
 




Discriminant validity was determined through SmartPLS using the Heterostst-Monostat method 
with an observed value of 0.853. Similarly, assessing variance inflation factors (VIF) to 
determine collinearity is important when formative factors are involved. VIF results were 
determined to be less than 3.3 with one exception, question 30 at 3.6. Most factor results were 
below 2.0 (Table 3).  
Table 3 
 
Composite Collinearity VIF 
 
Q #  Value  Q#  Value  Q#  Value  Q#  Value  Q#  Value 
Q12  1.669  Q23  2.657  Q33  1.057  Q43  1.565  Q53  1.306 
Q13  1.619  Q24  3.126  Q34  1.073  Q44  1.359  Q54  1.473 
Q14  1.291  Q25  1.521  Q35  1.532  Q45  1.310  Q55  2.275 
Q15  1.326  Q26  1.381  Q36  1.412  Q46  1.538  Q56  2.466 
Q16  1.112  Q27  2.291  Q37  1.253  Q47  1.178  Q57  1.122 
Q17  1.251  Q28  2.224  Q38  1.062  Q48  1.446  Q58  2.690 
Q18  1.011  Q29  2.293  Q39  1.921  Q49  2.367  Q59  2.320 
Q20  1.329  Q30  3.623  Q40  1.783  Q50  1.219  Q60  1.201 
Q21  1.251  Q31  3.288  Q41  1.768  Q51  2.054  Q61  2.541 
Q22  1.500  Q32  2.658  Q42  1.687  Q52  1.952     
 
Outer weights were measured with indicators 14, 18, 24, 29, 33, 35, 36, 45, 47, 53, 54, and 55 
displaying weight results lower than 1.96. Upon comparison with outer loadings for those 
indicators, indicators 18, 33, 35, 36, 47 and 53 remained below desired levels. Consequently, 
those indicators were removed from the model and the model was re-run following every 
deletion. Nevertheless, removing the indicators did not change composite reliability nor improve 
other model values significantly. Therefore, all indicators were retained within the model (Hair, 




et al., 2014). Finally, model fit was confirmed using standardized root mean square residuals 
(SRMR) with a result of 0.075.  
Composite Model Results - Path Analysis (Inner Model) 
All analyses were conducted through either SPSS (e.g., initial survey pilot results and 
demographic data) or SmartPLS (final survey analysis results). Path importance was determined 
using composite bootstrapping for statistical significance and strength of factor relationships was 
identified using f2 where less than .1 represents small effect, 0.15 is associated with moderate 
effect and .3 or larger constitutes large impact (Chin, Marcolin & Newsted, 2003). Also, 
significance for path coefficients is considered sufficient when the coefficient is greater than 0.2 
(Wong, 2013). Path coefficients for the composite models, confirm t-score interpretations. 
For the inner predictive model, variable relationship strength was assessed with an R2 of 
0.822 indicating a substantial effect for the five formative factors on behavioral intent. Yet, 
individual differences were observed for each of the factors. Path coefficients and t-statistic 
values for Knowledge (0.02; 0.632) and Penalties (0.068; 1.209) did not reflect a significant 
impact on the aggregated BHI dependent variable. Results for Self-efficacy (0.319; 5.534), 
Threat (0.218; 4.738) and Norms (0.549; 11.094) did, however demonstrate significant impact on 
BHI. F2 scores of 0.002, 1.082, 0.016, 0.322, and 0.211 for Knowledge, Norms, Penalties, Self-
efficacy, and Threat respectively indicate a range of effect t sizes. Norms reveled significant 
effect, Self-efficacy and Threat showed medium effect size, and there were insignificant effects 
for Knowledge and Penalties.  
Of note, Lowry and Gaskin (2014) suggest even small effect sizes may be significant. As 
displayed in composite model Figures 2 & 3. Knowledge and Penalties appear to have little 
effect on clinicians aggregated behavioral intent. In fact, Knowledge appears to have a slightly 




negative effect on behavior suggesting Knowledge without the impact of other influencing 
factors is not sufficient to create behavioral intent more broadly. Similarly, questions 33, 36, and 
53 displayed slightly negative effects on behaviors yet while questions 33 and 36 are included 
within the threat area, Threat still is associated with significant effect on Behavior. Penalties 
(including question 53) also contributes to the overall composite positive effect with the 
aggregated R2 displaying strength of the integrated relationships model above 0.8 (actual value 
of 0.822; Figure 2).  
Hypothesis Results 
Hypothesis results displayed varying results for model factors aligned with composite behavioral 
intent. The alternate hypothesis of H1:  Practitioners with greater knowledge of legal and 
ethical requirements to protect sensitive information and systems will adopt precautions 
was not substantiated within the composite model. The path coefficient of – 0.021 (p = 0.874) 
demonstrated no significant relationship to combined behavioral intent characteristics. 
Furthermore, the Knowledge t-score of 0.632 confirmed acceptance of the null hypothesis.   
However, the path t-score (5.534) and path coefficient (0.319) for Self-efficacy (p = 
0.025) indicated rejecting the null hypothesis and accepting the alternative hypothesis of H2: 
Practitioners with higher perceptions of self-efficacy will take greater direct precautions to 
protect sensitive information and digital systems. The effects of self-efficacy on a clinician’s 
intentions and are important considerations in establishing motivation and subsequent action to 
protect sensitive digital systems and information. 
Additionally, the path t-score (4.738) and path coefficient (0.218) for Threat validated 
rejection of the null hypothesis and accepting the alternative (p = 0.046). H3: Therapists with 
greater insight into the severity of the potential threat will enact more digital security 




protections. The clinician’s understanding and awareness of Threat dynamics effected the 
composite view of clinician responses to cyber security intent. 
Of note, the path t-score (11.094) and path coefficient (0.549) for Norms (p = 0.004) 
displayed the largest significance on behavioral intent.  These results determine rejecting the null 
hypothesis while accepting H4: A therapist’s commitment to protecting sensitive 
information/systems will be increased by their perception of compliance by other 
practitioners. Although inconsistencies appeared in answers to Norms indicator questions, the 
overall effect of the Norms area created significant motivation to protect privacy and 
confidentiality for clients and clinicians. 
Finally, results of the Penalty t-score (1.209) and path coefficient (0.068) revealed that 
the factor did not sufficiently impact behavioral intent to reject the null hypothesis (p = 0.64). 
Consequently, the null hypothesis in this case was accepted. While the alternate hypothesis of 
H5:  Practitioners who believe penalties will be associated with non-compliance of cyber 
security rules will take precautions to protect sensitive information was not accepted. 



























Composite Path Analysis and Behavioral Intent using Consistent Bootstrapping 
 
 
Individual Factor Results 
Although the composite model is not assessed for convergent validity in models with 
formative elements, each independent latent factor should be evaluated against its specific 
dependent variable (Garson, 2014; Starstedt, Ringle & Hair, 2016). Also important for formative 
factors, Andreev, Heart, Tsipi, Maoz, Hanan, Pliskin, and Nava (2009) stated, “The contribution 




power of each of the explanatory constructs can be substantiated by calculating the weighted 
effect of the independent construct on the dependent one…” (p. 8). Therefore, inner model 
measurements were conducted for each specific factor against their respective behavioral intent 
variables but specifically for convergent validity and predictive performance. Supporting 
convergent validity results are reflected in Figures 4 – 13: Knowledge = 0.726; Self-efficacy = 
0.707; Threat = 0.546; Norms = 0.885; and Penalties = 0.513 reflected acceptable convergence 
levels (e.g., path results above 0.5 required; Carlson & Herdman, 2010). 
Also, results for relationship significance and effect strength for the individual factors: 
Knowledge, Self-efficacy, Threat, Norms, and Penalties, appear in the figures below. All path 
and t-score values demonstrated both significance and strength associations reflecting each factor 
– behavioral intent area supported the predictive value of the instrument. Specific values and 
interpretations appear below by factor area. Additionally, p values for all factor – behavioral 
intent constructs demonstrated 0.000 significance (with the exception of indicator 60 at 0.152). 
Outer weights and loadings for individual factor structural integrity appear in appendices D, E, F, 
G, and H. 
Knowledge 
The path coefficient of 0.726 (Figure 4) indicates Knowledge has a significant effect on 
Knowledge Behavioral Intent (p = 0.000). While the R2 of .527 (Chin, Marcolin, & Newstad, 
2003) indicates almost 53% of the change in behavioral intent can be attributed to Knowledge 
factors. Additionally, an f2 of 1.112 represented a large effect between factors. Additionally, the 
Knowledge – Knowledge Behavioral Intent assessment provided predictive assurance for 
effective IV- DV model design. Structurally, the impact of Knowledge on Knowledge 
Behavioral Intent was also significant in establishing convergent validity with the same path 




coefficient of 0.726. The t-score of 7.734 substantiated path coefficient indications. Outer 




Knowledge Factor Analysis and Knowledge Behavioral Intent using Consistent PLS Algorithm 




The Self-efficacy path coefficient of 0.707 and bootstrapped t-score of 15.720 (Figure 5) 
indicated Self-efficacy has a significant effect on Self-efficacy Behavioral Intent (p = 0.000) and 
establishes convergent validity for the construct. While the R2 of .500 (Figure 5) indicated 50% 
of the change in behavioral intent can be attributed to Self-efficacy factors. Furthermore, an f2 of 
1.001 substantiated Self-efficacy’s large effect on Behavioral Intent. Outer weights and loadings 
















Threat results indicate a significant path coefficient of 0.546 and bootstrapped t-score of 
8.975 (p = 0.000; Figure 6).  Threat has a significant effect on Threat Behavioral Intent and 
convergence is not significant. While R2 of .298 (Figure 6) indicates almost 30% of the change in 
behavioral intent can be attributed to Threat perception factors. However, Threat has only a small 
effect on Threat Behavioral Intent with an f2 of 0.424. Finally, outer weights and loadings for 


















Norm results indicate a path coefficient of 0.885 and bootstrapped t-score of 26.329 (p = 
0.000; Figure 7).  Norms has the most significant effect on Normed Behavioral Intent among the 
factors studied. While an R2 of .782 (Figure 7) indicates 78% of the change in behavioral intent 
can be attributed to normative factors. Effect size was also demonstrated with an f2 of 3.598. 
Furthermore, convergence concerns were not present as determined by the path coefficient. 
Finally, outer weights and loadings for Norm relationships (See Appendix F) demonstrated 











Norms Factor Analysis and Norms Behavioral Intent using Consistent PLS Algorithm 
 
Penalties 
Penalty results indicate a path coefficient of 0.513 and bootstrapped t-score of 8.596 (p = 
0.000; Figure 8). The Penalties factor has a significant effect on Penalty Behavioral Intent. While 
the R2 of .263 (Figure 8) indicates 26% of the change in behavioral intent can be attributed to the 
Penalties factors. Effect size confirmed a small effect on Penalty Behavioral Intent with an f2 of 
0.357. Convergent validity was measured using the 0.513 path coefficient. Outer weights and 


















Behavioral Intent Theoretical Support 
The purpose of this research was to describe mental health practitioners’ current cyber security 
practices and the behavioral intentions influencing a therapist’s implementation of cyber security 
within clinical mental health settings. Behavioral intent involved establishing an understanding 
of the factors that influence a clinician’s decisions when implementing cyber security within 
their clinical practice. Factors assessed in this research included knowledge, self-efficacy, norms, 
threat awareness and penalties and were selected based on previous theoretical studies. Research 
results provided insights into the understanding clinicians claim to have of required mandates 
and the factors influencing a clinician’s behavioral intentions to conduct cyber security risk 
mitigation within their clinical practices. The impact of knowledge, self-efficacy, threat, norms, 
and penalties exert pressure on the behavioral intentions of practitioners to comply with legal and 
ethical requirements. Additionally, the results of this research support the model factors 
postulated to influence behavioral intent. Furthermore, the research model results reported here 
displayed general support for the theoretical precepts used to form earlier research model and 
theoretical constructs on behavior and motivation.  




Open systems theory (OST) (Katz & Kahn, 1978) predicts that behavioral intentions are 
affected by an environmental awareness which was tested in the research model through 
assessment of clinician knowledge claims aligned with behavioral intent (actions to mitigate 
cyber security risk). While greater than 70% (Table 4, Questions 12 and 13) of clinicians stated 
they know federal and state legal requirements and more than 90% (Table 4, Question 14)  
practitioners reported they know ethical mandates (professional organization and peer 
expectations), answers to many behavioral questions displayed a significant misunderstanding in 
how to minimize privacy and confidentiality risk.  For example, more than 78% (Table 4, 
Question 18) of practitioners stated that liability insurance alone will mitigate financial risk if 
sensitive information was lost. Yet, if practitioners do not also take other required actions 
mandated by ethics and law, insurers will most certainly claim mitigating factors themselves in 
refusing claims (not following the law relieves the insurance company of coverage 
responsibility). The resulting impact on clinicians may then range from loss of license to 
significant fines and other penalties. Furthermore, open systems theory proposes shared values 
and expectations as criteria impacting behavioral intent. While norms (alignment with 
professional organizations and/or colleagues) indeed showed the highest impact on behavioral 
intent within the study, and practitioners reported believing both professional organizations and 
our colleagues feel legal and ethical codes should be followed, only 41.9% (Table 4, Question 
47) believe the established rules are being followed. Finally, OST also places emphasis on rule 
enforcement (measured through the significance of penalties in generating behavioral intent). 
When penalties were considered as a contributory factor within the composite model, penalties 
were shown to have no significant effect on behavioral intent (t-score 1.209; Figure 3).  
 
 





Open Systems Theory Support 
 
Q12:  Knowledge of federal Law 




Yes  161  76.7  76.7  76.7 
No  49  23.3  23.3  100.0 
Total  210  100.0  100.0   
Q13:  Knowledge of state Law 




Yes  148  70.5  70.5  70.5 
No  58  27.6  27.6  98.1 
I don’t know  4  1.9  1.9  100.0 
Total  210  100.0  100.0   
Q14:  Knowledge of ethical requirements 




Yes  190  90.5  90.5  90.5 
No  20  9.5  9.5  100.0 
Total  210  100.0  100.0   
Q18:  Liability insurance alone for risk mitigation 




Yes  45  21.4  21.4  21.4 
No  165  78.6  78.6  100.0 
Total  210  100.0  100.0   
Q47:  Others follow laws and ethics 




Yes  45  21.4  21.4  21.4 
No  165  78.6  78.6  100.0 
I don’t know  1  0.5  0.5  100.0 
Total  210  100.0  100.0   
 




The TRIRISK model (Ferrer, Klein, Avishai, Jones, Villegas, & Sheeran, 2018) suggests 
reasoned judgement, feelings and experience impact behavioral intent. The knowledge of law 
and ethics and other model factors provides perspective around this area. Although clinicians 
report knowledge of legal and ethical requirements, mitigation measures for minimizing risk 
exposure are not often understood or applied effectively. In fact, when asked to identify all risk 
mitigation measures, approximately 1% (3 out of 210 respondents; Table 5) correctly selected all 
measures as important in minimizing risk (Accepting, Avoiding, Mitigating, and Transferring). 
Similarly, although not separately quantified, most mental health practices have not experienced 
a breach. Consequently, the experience of the consequences resulting from a compromise has not 
been felt.  
Table 5 
 
TRIRISK Model Support 
 
Q19:  All protective measures of sensitive digital information 




Yes  3  1.4  1.4  1.4 
No  207  98.6  98.6  100.0 
Total  210  100.0  100.0   
 
Expansive learning theory (Engeström & Sannino, 2009) suggests that during times of 
significant change, disciplines may not be completely mastered. Results of the survey clearly 
demonstrated incomplete mastery of the requirements and implementation actions aligned with 
behavioral intent and risk mitigation. While more than 90% (Table 6, Question 15) of 
respondents indicated protecting digital information was inseparable from successful practice, 
clinicians also indicated attending to security takes time away from primary responsibilities 
(53.8%; Table 6, Question 60).   






Expansive Learning Theory Support 
 
Q15:  Protecting sensitive information 




Yes  196  93.3  93.3  93.3 
No  12  5.7  5.7  99.0 
I don’t know  2  1.0  1.0  100.0 
Total  210  100.0  100.0   
 
Q60:  Attention to security  takes time 




Strongly agree  39  18.6  18.6  18.6 
Somewhat agree  74  35.2  35.2  53.8 
Neither agree nor disagree  43  20.5  20.5  74.3 
Somewhat disagree  35  16.7  16.7  91.0 
Strongly disagree  19  9.0  9.0  100.0 
Total  210  100.0  100.0   
 
 
General deterrence theory (Lee, Lee, and Yoo, 2003) emphasizes actions in relation to 
penalties, yet the threat of enforcement consequence (e.g., fines, license impact) is significantly 
mitigated by the anticipation of risk. Only 34.3% (Table 7, Question 35) of practitioners believe 
a security violation would result in financial loss and only 24.8% (Table 7, Question 36) believe 
their practice may lose sensitive data if breached. In fact, 66.2% (Table 7, Question 38) of our 
colleagues believe the cyber security issue is exaggerated. Minimizing the likelihood of adverse 
action and the potential impact of a cyber security breach on a practice enables clinicians to 
avoid behaviors which would draw off resources (e.g., time, money, etc.) and if potentially 
undiscoverable (e.g., an undetected/unreported compromise), mitigating the initial risk of breach 
exposure - breaches have often remained unrecognized and consequently unreported for years.  






General Deterrence Theory Support 
 
Q35:  Violations result in losses 




Extremely likely  17  8.1  8.1  8.1 
Somewhat likely  55  26.2  26.2  34.3 
Neither likely nor unlikely  57  27.1  27.1  61.4 
Somewhat unlikely  52  24.8  24.8  86.2 
Strongly unlikely  29  13.8  13.8  100.0 
Total  210  100.0  100.0   
Q36:  Sensitive data loss in security violations? 




Extremely likely  11  5.2  5.2  5.2 
Somewhat likely  41  19.5  19.5  24.8 
Neither likely nor unlikely  42  20.0  20.0  44.8 
Somewhat unlikely  80  38.1  38.1  82.98 
Strongly unlikely  36  17.1  17.1  100.0 
Total  210  100.0  100.0   
Q38:  Information security is exaggerated 




Strongly disagree  2  1.0  1.0  1.0 
Somewhat disagree  29  13.8  13.8  14.8 
Neither agree nor disagree  40  19.0  19.0  33.8 
Somewhat agree  63  30.0  30.0  63.8 
Strongly agree  76  36.2  36.2  100.0 
Total  210  100.0  100.0   
 
Social control theory (Lee, S. M., Lee, S., and Yoo, 2003) builds its’ constructs on the 
effect of norms on behavioral intent. Again, in this research, results demonstrated the strength of 
norms on behavioral intent. Yet the inconsistencies addressed under open systems theory apply 




to social control theory as well – while clinicians believe professional organizations and 
colleagues expect alignment with legal and ethical requirements (Table 8, Questions 45 and 46), 
they also believe others do not adhere to those requirements (Table 8, Question 47). 
Table 8 
 
Social Control Theory Support 
 
Q45:  Professional organization follows legal/ethical code 




Strongly agree  180  85.7  85.7  85.7 
Somewhat agree  20  9.5  9.5  95.2 
Neither agree nor disagree  8  3.8  3.8  99.0 
Somewhat disagree  2  1.0  1.0  100.0 
Total  210  100.0  100.0   
Q46:  Colleagues follow laws and ethics 




Strongly agree  128  61.0  61.0  61.0 
Somewhat agree  59  28.1  28.1  89.0 
Neither agree nor disagree  18  8.6  8.6  97.6 
Somewhat disagree  5  2.4  2.4  100.0 
Total  210  100.0  100.0   
Q47:  Others follow laws and ethics 




Yes  88  41.9  41.9  41.9 
No  121  57.6  57.6  99.5 
I don’t know  1  0.5  0.5  100.0 
Total  210  100.0  100.0   
         
Control theory (Carver & Scheier, 1982) incorporates the idea of strong vs weak bonds 
within systems. The study included small practices through sole proprietorships yet even within 
small practices, practitioners are usually independent contractors vice employees of the practice. 
Consequently, while systems may be influenced by the norms established by the practice, and 




practitioners claim that policies and procedures are enforced (94.8%; Table 9, Question 32), only 




Control Theory Support 
 
Q21:  Review of cyber security policies, processes, technologies 




Yes  56  26.7  26.7  26.7 
No  153  72.9  72.9  99.5 
I don’t know  1  0.5  0.5  100.0 
Total  210  100.0  100.0   
Q32: Ensure policies are followed 




Strongly agree  157  74.8  74.8  74.8 
Somewhat agree  42  20.0  20.0  94.8 
Neither agree nor disagree  9  4.3  4.3  99.0 
Somewhat disagree  1  0.5  0.5  99.5 
Strongly disagree  1  0.5  0.5  100.0 
Total  210  100.0  100.0   
 
 
The theory of planned behavior (Madden, Ellen & Ajzen, 1992) identifies an expectation 
of results as significant in determining behavioral intent. Recognition of the ability to effect 
results is partially a function of a practitioner’s self-efficacy. This study showed that self-efficacy 
has a significant effect on behavioral intent and clinicians reported that even though they know 
the law requires actions to reduce the risk of data compromise, only 32.4% (Table 10, Question 
17) have conducted a risk assessment within the last year and only 49.5% (Table 10, Question 




25) report confidence in their ability to conduct the assessment. Finally, only 57.6% (Table 10, 
Question 34) of practitioners agreed that information security threats are controllable.  
Table 10 
 
Theory of Planned Behavior Support 
 
Q17:  Risk assessment 




Yes  68  32.4  32.4  32.4 
No  142  67.6  67.6  100.0 
Total  210  100.0  100.0   
Q25:  Confident about risk assessment 




Yes  104  49.5  49.5  49.5 
No  106  50.5  50.5  100.0 
Total  210  100.0  100.0   
Q34:  Threats are controllable 




Strongly agree  19  9.0  9.0  9.0 
Somewhat agree  102  48.6  48.6  57.6 
Neither agree nor disagree  39  18.6  18.6  76.2 
Somewhat disagree  44  21.0  21.0  97.1 
Strongly disagree  6  2.9  2.9  100.0 
Total  210  100.0  100.0   
         
Finally, risk homeostasis (West, 2008; Chronopoulos, Panaousis, & Grossklags, 2018) 
provides insights into behavioral intent through the concepts of risk tolerance and risk 
acceptance. The theory posits that greater belief in the security of the systems within a practice 
leads to greater complacency in establishing protections. As a function of belief in threat 
significance, the susceptibility of systems to compromise, and the potential impact of a breach 
practitioners will minimize behavioral intent in addressing potential compromise. 




Misunderstanding the threat and the implications of cyber security lapses (24.8% believe a 
breach will result in the loss of data (Table 11, Question 36); 50.0% believe systems are 
susceptible to attack (Table 11, Question 33); 34.3% believe a compromise will result in 
financial loss (Table 11, Question 35) produces an ineffective approach to security policy, 
procedures, and action. 
Although the theories employed in constructing the model for this research enabled 
significant context for factor development aligned to behavioral intent, there remains much 
additional motivational and behavioral perspective to be explored. While clinicians express a 
knowledge of law and ethics, their behavioral intents display emphasis based on three factor 
areas – norms, self-efficacy, and threat awareness (Figures 2 and 3). Yet based on the questions 
and responses explored above, inconsistencies appear in the assertions of knowledge and the 
implementation of security practices across Marriage and Family Therapists, Counselors, and 
Psychologists. These inconsistencies serve to attest to the complexity of predicting behavior 
based on specific theoretical models and compound the challenges of creating effective 
behavioral mitigation approaches.  
Finally, several study limitations are noteworthy. First, surveys have been shown to be 
the least effective data gathering tool when populations feel their responses may reflect poorly on 
themselves or their profession. To mitigate associated risks in the data, the survey was 
anonymous and was promulgated across multiple different professional populations and areas of 
the country. However, even with those procedures in place, the predictive certainty of the study 
must be viewed as optimistic in terms of behavioral intent. Second, multiple attempts were made 
to connect with potential respondents from different populations resulting in 210 completed 
surveys.  While that number provides insight into the knowledge and behavioral intent of   






Risk Homeostasis Support 
 
Q33:  Systems are susceptible to attack 




Strongly agree  34  16.2  16.2  16.2 
Somewhat agree  71  33.8  33.8  50.0 
Neither agree nor disagree  45  21.4  21.4  71.4 
Somewhat disagree  42  20.0  20.0  91.4 
Strongly disagree  18  8.6  8.6  100.0 
Total  210  100.0  100.0   
Q35:  Violations result in losses 




Extremely likely  17  8.1  8.1  8.1 
Somewhat likely  55  26.2  26.2  34.3 
Neither likely nor unlikely  57  27.1  27.1  61.4 
Somewhat unlikely  52  24.8  24.8  86.2 
Strongly unlikely  29  13.8  13.8  100.0 
Total  210  100.0  100.0   
Q36:  Sensitive data loss in security violations 




Extremely likely  11  5.2  5.2  5.2 
Somewhat likely  41  19.5  19.5  24.8 
Neither likely nor unlikely  42  20.0  20.0  44.8 
Somewhat unlikely  80  38.1  38.1  82.9 
Strongly unlikely  36  17.1  17.1  100.0 
Total  210  100.0  100.0   
 
clinicians, results should only be viewed as representative of the larger professional community. 
Additionally, results should not be viewed as conclusive in regard to the broader professional 
community without confirmatory research. Third, while statistical data manipulation determined 




correlations among data elements at required levels, inferring causative relationships would be 
premature.  
  




Chapter V- Summary, Implications, & Recommendations  
 The questions posed in this research concern the current practices of clinicians and the 
factors which serve to influence a therapist’s behavioral intentions to address the protection of 
sensitive information and systems in clinical practice? Consequently, the study was designed to 
identify the factors that affect the behavioral intent of clinicians in conducting cyber security 
within their practices as mandated by law and professional ethics guidance.  The research was 
undertaken to provide insight into the factors which serve to influence a therapist’s behavioral 
intentions to address the protection of sensitive information and systems in clinical practice. A 
researcher developed survey was created based on earlier general cyber security survey designs. 
Questions were developed to evaluate the effect of multiple motivational factors on behavioral 
intent based on several existing theoretical constructs. Factors were then assessed individually to 
determine formative and reflective relationships and in combination to determine the 
significance of the composite factors on behavioral intent.  
Summary 
 The project consisted of a convenience sample of 210 Marriage and Family Therapists, 
counselors, and psychologists in private practice across various state and regional professional 
organizations. Survey links were advertised by the professional organization and anonymous 
results provided through Qualtrics. At the conclusion of the survey, respondents who submitted 
the finalized survey were provided an author created risk assessment template based on the 
National Institute of Standards and Technologies (NIST) generalized templates but tailored for 
mental health practitioner use. 
 Study results portray a pattern of incomplete knowledge for clinician’s as they attempt to 
implement cyber security responsibilities within a practice. Although practitioners believe they 




have the requisite knowledge to address cyber security, inconsistencies in understanding of 
implementation responsibilities to reduce confidentiality and privacy risk create gaps in 
protecting clients and practitioners. Clinicians also reported a lack of confidence in conducting 
required risk assessments, have little understanding or awareness of the threat, and fail to 
anticipate consequences for non-compliance behaviors. Furthermore, although clinicians 
anticipate professional organizations and colleagues expect compliance with laws and ethical 
mandates, clinicians also believe specified standards are not being followed. Finally, although 
clinicians reported awareness of penalties associated with a breach or audit, their behaviors did 
not reflect a true understanding of the severity of fines, or other consequences associated with 
failures to comply with established standards. 
 Several theories of motivation were used as the conceptual basis for question 
development and testing clinician behaviors. Notably the tenents of open systems theory, 
expansive learning theory, general deterrence theory, social control theory, control theory, the 
theory of planned behavior, risk homeostasis, and the TRIRISK model were supported through 
this research as applied to mental health clinicians in private practice although data analysis 
showed some inconsistencies in relation to theory application. Knowledge, self-efficacy, threat, 
norms, and penalties were identified as potential influencing factors in predicting the behavioral 
intentions of clinicians when adopting cyber security measures within their practice. While all 
indicators produced significant results against specific influencing factors aligned with specific 
factor behaviors, the effect of Norms on behavioral intent proved most significant. Of note, both 
Knowledge and Penalties revealed the least impact on their specific behaviors and were not 
significant when aligned against all behaviors. Specific questions (Appendix A) and associated 
frequency data (Appendix B) indicated disparities within clinician responses. Implications reflect 




the potential that knowledge alone is insufficient to produce behavior changes while concerns 
over penalty enforcement may also be lacking. Conversely, when clinicians believe others 
engage in required security and privacy mandates, they may be more diligent in enacting their 
own protocols. Similarly, while self-efficacy is an important factor in initiating behaviors, threat 
awareness may only be significant as threat understanding increases. Finally, knowledge may 
create conditions which are necessary as a precursor for clinician action, but behavioral intent 
occurs only if aligned with other motivating factors.  
Implications 
Path coefficients, R2, f2, and t-scores demonstrated significant predictive results.  However, this 
research also indicated a lack of actual knowledge as clinician behavioral intent often did not 
align with specific laws, guidelines, rules or best practices for protecting digital systems and 
information. Furthermore, a clinician’s uncertain confidence in implementing cyber security 
within their practice may create additional barriers to completing required actions. For example, 
although risk assessments are required, many clinicians indicated they do not know how to 
perform the assessment (Appendix H, Question 25). Also, an incomplete understanding of threat 
dynamics may militate against effective action within a practice.  Nevertheless, professional 
emphasis on privacy and confidentiality remains a constant for all mental health practitioners – 
psychologists, counselors, and marriage and family therapists. Of note, uncertainty surrounding 
the implementation of security standards and inconsistency in enforcement of mandated 
responsibilities also appeared to effect behaviors.  For those who depend on specific standards to 
provide prescriptive direction vice general guidelines, implementation of required actions may be 
difficult. Likewise, if enforcement of required actions is inconsistent, practitioners may believe 
that weathering an inspection or a breach may be the preferred alternative.  




Although knowledge of requirements appears to be a prerequisite in adoption of 
protective behaviors, the lack of ability to produce effective mitigation results coupled with a 
lack of threat awareness create gaps in the application of available risk mitigation measures.  
Additionally, consistency of professional messaging may contribute to lower levels of 
engagement behavior with regard to cyber security (e.g., when practitioners hear a minimizing 
message, they may also minimize the risk). Similarly, while experts provide insights into cyber 
law, ethics, threat, and mitigation opportunities, the material is often discussed in conjunction 
with other ethical responsibilities and consequently minimized in significance. Frequently, those 
providing instruction are not current in cyber security and treat it as a bolt-on to their ethics 
instruction, may not be current in the areas covered by the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPPA), the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical 
Health Act (HITECH), Federal Trade Commission (FTC) regulations and ethical codes, or may 
misunderstand the extent of digital systems and information covered under the guidance. 
Consequently, certification to provide ethics continuing education units (CEUs) may be 
insufficient to also provide cyber security awareness CEUs. Furthermore, our academic 
institutions could create a greater awareness of cyber security responsibilities by introducing 
courses on cyber security in clinical practice. Emphasis by the institutions that provide clinician 
training may establish a depth of awareness for clinicians into the responsibilities for 
confidentiality and privacy aligned to the use of digital systems in practice. Nevertheless, 
clinicians appear to take confidentiality and privacy responsibilities seriously and strive to 
provide environments that optimize security for their clients, their colleagues and themselves. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that clinicians aligned as contractors to a private practice may 
believe confidentiality and privacy responsibilities accrue to the practice rather than remain 




individual responsibilities. Other evidence suggests that practitioners may feel overwhelmed by 
therapeutic responsibilities themselves, time required to mitigate risk and align with legal and 
ethical requirements, and feel the resources expended will not create additional security. These 
misunderstandings of legal and ethical requirements may create a behavioral malaise which 
results in inaction when even minimal attempts to mitigate risk (e.g., conducting a risk 
assessment, establishing training for employees/clinicians, specifying security procedures in 
guidance documents, etc.) can produce valuable protections.  
Recommendations 
 Awareness of cyber security responsibilities for mental health practitioners is key to 
establishing effective risk mitigation practices. In that regard, education and training are 
important strategies for advancing protections in addressing cyber security in mental health. That 
education could be advanced during master’s degree and/or doctoral programs by introducing 
specific ethical blocks dealing with cyber security (e.g., how to conduct a risk assessment, etc.). 
Additionally, continuing education could be enhanced by requiring cyber security training 
aligned to development of threat awareness, understanding requirements for a practice vice 
unnecessary uses of technologies, and methods to accept, avoid, mitigate and transfer risk. These 
approaches could be assessed in comparison to privacy and confidentiality as specified through 
law and ethical guidelines to mitigate risk at all levels - client, clinician, and associated 
professionals. Additionally, professional organizations and/or licensing boards could become 
significantly more engaged in ensuring specific standards are developed and enforced. While 
federal agencies have the authority to perform audits of cyber security for covered entities, 
professional organizations and licensing boards could easily adopt approaches to ensure 
minimum requirements have been met. Requiring a risk assessment to be submitted along with 




licensing documentation would be a start. Also, adopting cyber security compliance 
presentations at state and national conferences could advance awareness and help create insights 
into security trends and legal or ethical changes. Furthermore, journal articles providing topical 
insights may provide added exposure to current best practices and normed behaviors. 
 Finally, a thought process that suggests there is safety in numbers and the likelihood of a 
breach is remote, fails to acknowledge the legal and ethical responsibilities of our profession.  
Education, training, expectations of others, and the threat of sanctions may not serve to compel 
behavioral change. Rather, recognition of our responsibilities to our clients, colleagues and 
ourselves may remain the basis for effective cyber security. Motivation for change is enacted 
when individuals recognize patterns of behavior as ineffective in creating desired conditions. To 
establish an awareness of the need for change, professionals may need to examine their current 
approaches and balance effective action with the resources available. Yet commitment (Locke, 
1996) to re-evaluating current action requires an ongoing effort to align behavior with values – 
not accepting all risk as a foregone conclusion. 
Future studies 
This research provided preliminary perspectives into the factors that influence a clinician’s cyber 
security behaviors for privacy and confidentiality within clinical practice. However, additional 
research could be conducted to identify the effect of other factors on behavioral intent. Also, 
confirmatory research could be undertaken to verify findings produced in this study. Similarly, 
insights into normed behavior suggested the largest effect on clinician behaviors and yet a 
substantial number of clinicians reported not anticipating their colleagues were actually 
following legal and ethical mandates (Appendix H, Question 47). Therefore, future research 
could also be initiated to assess inconsistencies in the results observed here.  Finally, qualitative 




and mixed methods approaches may reveal additional insights into factors effecting behaviors. 
Specific populations could then be considered along with other approaches to influence behavior 
that align mandates with action (Locke, 1996; Herath and Rao, 2009). Follow-on research 
associated with this study will include a qualitative study to investigate additional clinician 
awareness factors contributing to behavioral intent. Further research associated with this study 
will address the potential expansion of model parameters to test behavioral contributing factors 
and the effectiveness of recommended changes in education, continuing education approaches, 
and professional organization involvement in rule enforcement.  
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Appendix A: Cyber Security in Mental Health Questionnaire 
Demographics 
Q2 Are you a licensed mental health professional? 
Q3 Please identify your license category. 
Q4 Please identify your geographic region: 
Q5 Gender 
Q6 Age 
Q7 Highest Level of Education 
Q8 Primary Employment Setting 
Q9 Primary Employment Location 
Q10 Number of Years in Practice 
Q11 Number of Therapists in Practice 
 
Knowledge 
Q12 Knowledge of Federal law. 
Q13 Knowledge of State law 
Q14 Knowledge of Ethical requirements 
Q18 Liability insurance 
 
Knowledge Behavioral Intent 
Q15 Protecting sensitive information 
Q16 Risk of compromise 
Q17 Risk assessment 
Q18 Liability insurance alone for protection 
Q19 All protective measures of sensitive digital information 
Q20 Reduce the risk of compromise  
Q21 Review of cyber security policies, processes, technologies 
Q22 Knowledge of HIPAA, HITECH, FTC, state laws and ethical guidelines. 
 





Q23 Confident in my skills  
Q24 Confident in designing policies and processes 
Q25 Confident about risk assessments 
Q26 I can make a difference 
Q27 Confident in implementing protections  
Q28 Confident in reducing risks 
 
Self-efficacy: Behavioral Intent 
Q29 Attention to cyber security   
Q30 Steps to ensure security 
Q31 Steps to mitigate a breach 
Q32 Ensure policies are followed 
 
Threat 
Q33 Systems are susceptible to attack  
Q34 Threats are controllable 
Q35 Violations result in losses 
Q36 Sensitive data loss in security violations 
Q37 Information security affects my practice 
Q38 Information security is exaggerated 
 
Threat: Behavioral Intent 
Q39 Understanding capabilities of attackers   
Q40 Information security inseparable from practice 
Q41 Threat actor motivations 
Q42 Awareness of the threats 
 
Norms 
Q43 I care about laws and ethical guidelines  




Q44 Aligning actions with law and ethical guidelines 
Q45 Professional organization follows legal/ethical codes 
Q46 Colleagues follow laws and ethics 
Q47 Others follow laws/ethics 
Q48 Aligning practices upholds professional commitments 
 
Norms: Behavioral Intent 
Q49 Compliance with the legal/ethical codes 
Q50 Practice standards and peers. 
Q51 Dedicating resources to information systems 
Q52 I follow legal and ethical policies  
 
Penalties 
Q53 There are penalties  
Q54 Security breaches have consequences 
Q55 Productivity is threatened by incident 
Q56 Profitability is threatened by incident  
Q57 Understanding consequences of a breach 
 
Penalties: Behavioral Intent 
Q58 Reduce penalties  
Q59 Resources reduce penalties  
Q60 Attention to security takes time  
Q61 Aligning security with laws and ethics 











Appendix B: Composite Statistics 
Table B1 
 
Composite Convergent Reliability Outer Loadings 
 






 T Statistics  P Values 
Q12 Knowledge  0.842  0.805  0.092  9.143 
 
0.000 
Q13 Knowledge  0.897  0.861  0.072  12.481 
 
0.000 
Q14 Knowledge  0.628  0.584  0.191  3.291 
 
0.001 
Q15 Composite BHI  0.385  0.367  0.110  3.512 
 
0.000 
Q16 Composite BHI  0.175  0.171  0.086  2.038 
 
0.042 
Q17 Composite BHI  0.459  0.448  0.054  8.494 
 
0.000 
Q18 Knowledge  0.189  0.180  0.162  1.167 
 
0.243 
Q20 Composite BHI  0.308  0.300  0.114  2.718 
 
0.007 
Q21 Composite BHI  0.337  0.332  0.061  5.569 
 
0.000 
Q22 Composite BHI  0.526  0.517  0.084  6.250 
 
0.000 
Q23 Self-efficacy  0.742  0.724  0.084  8.875 
 
0.000 
Q24 Self-efficacy  0.765  0.749  0.071  10.725 
 
0.000 
Q25 Self-efficacy  0.669  0.659  0.060  11.080 
 
0.000 
Q26 Self-efficacy  0.734  0.721  0.074  9.925 
 
0.000 
Q27 Self-efficacy  0.866  0.846  0.050  17.145 
 
0.000 
Q28 Self-efficacy  0.753  0.732  0.081  9.351 
 
0.000 
Q29 Composite BHI  0.696  0.694  0.054  12.988 
 
0.000 
Q30 Composite BHI  0.695  0.697  0.057  12.250 
 
0.000 
Q31 Composite BHI  0.754  0.749  0.050  15.036 
 
0.000 
Q32 Composite BHI  0.746  0.737  0.056  13.439 
 
0.000 
Q33 Threat  -0.198  -0.191  0.112  1.770 
 
0.077 
Q34 Threat  0.531  0.507  0.122  4.356 
 
0.000 
Q35 Threat  0.328  0.314  0.124  2.640 
 
0.008 
Q36 Threat  -0.046  -0.047  0.157  0.293 
 
0.770 
Q37 Threat  0.763  0.763  0.091  8.367 
 
0.000 
Q38 Threat  0.632  0.609  0.114  5.525 
 
0.000 
Q39 Composite BHI  0.449  0.460  0.078  5.787 
 
0.000 
Q40 Composite BHI  0.567  0.568  0.061  9.225 
 
0.000 
Q41 Composite BHI  0.431  0.434  0.063  6.873 
 
0.000 
Q42 Composite BHI  0.654  0.650  0.063  10.408 
 
0.000 




Q43 Norms  0.742  0.730  0.007  10.529 
 
0.000 
Q44 Norms  0.809  0.805  0.059  13.805 
 
0.000 
Q45 Norms  0.467  0.459  0.098  4.769 
 
0.000 
Q46 Norms  0.648  0.639  0.067  9.647 
 
0.000 
Q47 Norms  0.346  0.342  0.064  5.437 
 
0.000 
Q48 Norms  0.680  0.672  0.074  9.227 
 
0.000 
Q49 Composite BHI  0.652  0.648  0.069  9.489 
 
0.000 
Q50 Composite BHI  0.219  0.219  0.075  2.941 
 
0.003 
Q51 Composite BHI  0.602  0.603  0.060  10.058 
 
0.000 
Q52 Composite BHI  0.645  0.631  0.075  8.615 
 
0.000 
Q53 Penalties  0.319  0.312  0.157  2.028 
 
0.043 
Q54 Penalties  0.405  0.444  0.128  3.508 
 
0.000 
Q55 Penalties  0.422  0.409  0.136  3.108 
 
0.002 
Q56 Penalties  0.518  0.501  0.117  4.431 
 
0.000 
Q57 Penalties  0.939  0.907  0.057  16.432 
 
0.000 
Q58 Composite BHI  0.647  0.649  0.052  12.365 
 
0.000 
Q59 Composite BHI  0.462  0.466  0.064  7.228 
 
0.000 
Q60 Composite BHI  -0.251  -0.240  0.077  3.270 
 
0.001 































Composite Convergent Reliability Outer Weights 
 






 T Statistics  P Values 
Q12 Knowledge  0.403  0.388  0.180  2.237 
 
0.025 
Q13 Knowledge  0.558  0.543  0.180  3.102 
 
0.002 
Q14 Knowledge  0.224  0.192  0.243  0.920 
 
0.358 
Q15 Composite BHI  0.057  0.054  0.015  3.779 
 
0.000 
Q16 Composite BHI  0.026  0.025  0.013  2.051 
 
0.040 
Q17 Composite BHI  0.068  0.066  0.010  6.688 
 
0.000 
Q18 Knowledge  0.107  0.101  0.143  0.752 
 
0.452 
Q20 Composite BHI  0.045  0.043  0.015  3.053 
 
0.002 
Q21 Composite BHI  0.050  0.049  0.010  4.905 
 
0.000 
Q22 Composite BHI  0.077  0.076  0.010  7.537 
 
0.000 
Q23 Self-efficacy  0.174  0.166  0.151  1.148 
 
0.251 
Q24 Self-efficacy  0.052  0.060  0.145  0.357 
 
0.721 
Q25 Self-efficacy  0.216  0.213  0.096  2.256 
 
0.024 
Q26 Self-efficacy  0.380  0.377  0.112  3.402 
 
0.001 
Q27 Self-efficacy  0.439  0.424  0.115  3.827 
 
0.000 
Q28 Self-efficacy  0.037  0.032  0.142  0.261 
 
0.794 
Q29 Composite BHI  0.102  0.102  0.008  13.051 
 
0.000 
Q30 Composite BHI  0.102  0.102  0.007  13.875 
 
0.000 
Q31 Composite BHI  0.111  0.110  0.008  13.624 
 
0.000 
Q32 Composite BHI  0.110  0.108  0.008  13.624 
 
0.000 
Q33 Threat  -0.151  -0.146  0.105  1.441 
 
0.150 
Q34 Threat  0.325  0.312  0.116  2.802 
 
0.005 
Q35 Threat  0.219  0.209  0.124  1.766 
 
0.077 
Q36 Threat  -0.206  -0.203  0.145  1.415 
 
0.157 
Q37 Threat  0.561  0.542  0.127  4.432 
 
0.000 
Q38 Threat  0.456  0.441  0.130  3.502 
 
0.000 
Q39 Composite BHI  0.066  0.067  0.010  6.379 
 
0.000 
Q40 Composite BHI  0.083  0.083  0.008  10.167 
 
0.000 
Q41 Composite BHI  0.063  0.064  0.009  7.183 
 
0.000 
Q42 Composite BHI  0.096  0.095  0.009  10.491 
 
0.000 
Q43 Norms  0.284  0.280  0.083  3.413 
 
0.001 




Q44 Norms  0.467  0.479  0.076  6.251 
 
0.000 
Q45 Norms  0.071  0.065  0.067  1.057 
 
0.291 
Q46 Norms  0.250  0.242  0.084  2.976 
 
0.003 
Q47 Norms  0.082  0.082  0.059  1.389 
 
0.165 
Q48 Norms  0.265  0.261  0.085  3.114 
 
0.002 
Q49 Composite BHI  0.096  0.095  0.008  12.117 
 
0.000 
Q50 Composite BHI  0.032  0.032  0.011  2.874 
 
0.004 
Q51 Composite BHI  0.089  0.089  0.011  8.033 
 
0.000 
Q52 Composite BHI  0.095  0.093  0.010  9.443 
 
0.000 
Q53 Penalties  -0.069  -0.060  0.164  0.418 
 
0.676 
Q54 Penalties  0.093  0.098  0.176  0.529 
 
0.597 
Q55 Penalties  0.057  0.050  0.156  0.366 
 
0.715 
Q56 Penalties  0.276  0.268  0.145  1.900 
 
0.057 
Q57 Penalties  0.866  0.828  0.085  10.132 
 
0.000 
Q58 Composite BHI  0.095  0.096  0.010  9.058 
 
0.000 
Q59 Composite BHI  0.068  0.069  0.011  5.920 
 
0.000 
Q60 Composite BHI  -0.037  -0.035  0.011  3.225 
 
0.001 































Appendix C:  Knowledge Statistics 
Table C1 
 
Knowledge Outer Loadings 
 






 T Statistics  P Values 
Q12 Knowledge  0.877  0.851  0.070  12.585 
 
0.000 
Q13 Knowledge  0.861  0.835  0.069  12.475 
 
0.000 
Q14 Knowledge  0.521  0.502  0.154  3.385 
 
0.001 
Q15 Behavioral Intent  0.243  0.240  0.117  2.083 
 
0.037 
Q16 Behavioral Intent  0.303  0.292  0.095  3.209 
 
0.001 
Q17 Behavioral Intent  0.499  0.478  0.072  6.925 
 
0.000 
Q18 Knowledge  0.307  0.288  0.153  2.011 
 
0.044 
Q20 Behavioral Intent  0.234  0.235  0.108  2.168 
 
0.030 
Q21 Behavioral Intent  0.334  0.325  0.086  3.870 
 
0.000 








Knowledge Outer Weights 
 






 T Statistics  P Values 
Q12 Knowledge  0.521  0.513  0.143  3.642 
 
0.000 
Q13 Knowledge  0.499  0.484  0.157  3.189 
 
0.001 
Q14 Knowledge  0.087  0.071  0.184  0.472 
 
0.637 
Q15 Behavioral Intent  0.253  0.239  0.103  2.453 
 
0.014 
Q16Behavioral Intent  0.315  0.304  0.106  2.969 
 
0.003 
Q17Behavioral Intent  0.518  0.497  0.076  6.804 
 
0.000 
Q18 Knowledge  0.220  0.209  0.143  1.534 
 
0.125 
Q20Behavioral Intent  0.243  0.239  0.097  2.505 
 
0.012 
Q21Behavioral Intent  0.347  0.334  0.075  4.599 
 
0.000 
Q22Behavioral Intent  0.256  0.246  0.098  2.620 
 
0.009 




Appendix D:  Self-efficacy Statistics 
Table D1 
Self-efficacy Outer Loadings 
 






 T Statistics  P Values 
Q23 Self-efficacy  0.752  0.730  0.084  8.920 
 
0.000 
Q24 Self-efficacy  0.754  0.734  0.074  10.199 
 
0.000 
Q25 Self-efficacy  0.606  0.594  0.064  9.473 
 
0.000 
Q26 Self-efficacy  0.769  0.750  0.081  9.496 
 
0.000 
Q27 Self-efficacy  0.839  0.819  0.065  12.858 
 
0.000 
Q28 Self-efficacy  0.809  0.791  0.070  11.613 
 
0.000 
Q29 Behavioral Intent  0.816  0.816  0.051  16.019 
 
0.000 
Q30 Behavioral Intent  0.778  0.785  0.060  13.010 
 
0.000 
Q31 Behavioral Intent  0.805  0.800  0.060  13.456 
 
0.000 





Self-efficacy Outer Weights 
 






 T Statistics  P Values 
Q23 Self-efficacy  0.191  0.175  0.162  1.178 
 
0.239 
Q24 Self-efficacy  0.050  0.052  0.144  0.347 
 
0.729 
Q25 Self-efficacy  0.118  0.120  0.094  1.255 
 
0.210 
Q26 Self-efficacy  0.408  0.405  0.094  3.232 
 
0.001 
Q27 Self-efficacy  0.346  0.334  0.126  2.446 
 
0.015 
Q28 Self-efficacy  0.177  0.178  0.142  1.073 
 
0.283 
Q29 Behavioral Intent  0.289  0.292  0.025  11.719 
 
0.000 
Q30 Behavioral Intent  0.275  0.279  0.016  17.664 
 
0.000 
Q31 Behavioral Intent  0.285  0.285  0.015  19.349 
 
0.000 
Q32 Behavioral Intent  0.306  0.303  0.020  15.590 
 
0.000 




Appendix E:  Threat Statistics 
Table E1 
  
Threat Outer Loadings 
 






 T Statistics  P Values 
Q33 Threat  -0.068  -0.056  0.152  0.448 
 
0.654 
Q34 Threat  0.574  0.542  0.125  4.584 
 
0.000 
Q35 Threat  0.303  0.285  0.138  2.194 
 
0.028 
Q36 Threat  0.046  0.041  0.153  0.301 
 
0.763 
Q37 Threat  0.812  0.772  0.091  8.929 
 
0.000 
Q38 Threat  0.596  0.572  0.130  4.602 
 
0.000 
Q39 Behavioral Intent  0.604  0.604  0.094  6.419 
 
0.000 
Q40 Behavioral Intent  0.812  0.795  0.085  9.540 
 
0.000 
Q41 Behavioral Intent  0.604  0.601  0.084  7.173 
 
0.000 





Threat Outer Weights 
 






 T Statistics  P Values 
Q33 Threat  -0.027  -0.015  0.146  0.183 
 
0.855 
Q34 Threat  0.383  0.365  0.126  3.029 
 
0.002 
Q35 Threat  0.092  0.081  0.151  0.606 
 
0.544 
Q36 Threat  -0.085  -0.083  0.155  0.549 
 
0.583 
Q37 Threat  0.631  0.605  0.132  4.793 
 
0.000 
Q38 Threat  0.407  0.387  0.146  2.781 
 
0.005 
Q39 Behavioral Intent  0.323  0.325  0.048  6.785 
 
0.000 
Q40 Behavioral Intent  0.433  0.426  0.050  8.700 
 
0.000 
Q41 Behavioral Intent  0.323  0.324  0.042  7.627 
 
0.000 
Q42 Behavioral Intent  0.259  0.258  0.057  4.582 
 
0.000 




Appendix F:  Norms Statistics 
Table F1 
 
Norms Outer Loading 
 






 T Statistics  P Values 
Q43 Norms  0.768  0.754  0.077  10.010 
 
0.000 
Q44 Norms  0.711  0.706  0.073  9.730 
 
0.000 
Q45 Norms  0.390  0.387  0.110  3.533 
 
0.000 
Q46 Norms  0.699  0.693  0.062  11.357 
 
0.000 
Q47 Norms  0.401  0.396  0.062  6.460 
 
0.000 
Q48 Norms  0.721  0.709  0.063  11.457 
 
0.000 
Q49 Behavioral Intent  0.814  0.809  0.053  15.270 
 
0.000 
Q50 Behavioral Intent  0.379  0.376  0.074  5.134 
 
0.000 
Q51 Behavioral Intent  0.518  0.519  0.076  6.803 
 
0.000 







Norms Outer Weights 
 






 T Statistics  P Values 
Q43 Norms  0.342  0.337  0.092  3.710 
 
0.000 
Q44 Norms  0.329  0.328  0.078  4.226 
 
0.000 
Q45 Norms  -0.037  -0.037  0.081  0.460 
 
0.645 
Q46 Norms  0.354  0.353  0.086  4.102 
 
0.000 
Q47 Norms  0.111  0.106  0.055  2.023 
 
0.043 
Q48 Norms  0.313  0.306  0.073  4.275 
 
0.000 
Q49Behavioral Intent  0.458  0.457  0.032  14.231 
 
0.000 
Q50Behavioral Intent  0.213  0.214  0.043  4.985 
 
0.000 
Q51Behavioral Intent  0.292  0.292  0.038  7.721 
 
0.000 
Q52Behavioral Intent  0.383  0.380  0.029  13.368 
 
0.000 




Appendix G:  Penalties Statistics 
Table G1 
 
Penalties Outer Loadings 
 






 T Statistics  P Values 
Q53 Penalties  0.315  0.305  0.150  2.096 
 
0.036 
Q54 Penalties  0.551  0.529  0.136  4.058 
 
0.000 
Q55 Penalties  0.412  0.399  0.154  2.673 
 
0.008 
Q56 Penalties  0.524  0.508  0.136  3.842 
 
0.000 
Q57 Penalties  0.917  0.877  0.074  12.324 
 
0.000 
Q58 Behavioral Intent  0.837  0.826  0.068  12.246 
 
0.000 
Q59 Behavioral Intent  0.702  0.693  0.097  7.227 
 
0.000 
Q60 Behavioral Intent  -0.212  -0.200  0.149  1.425 
 
0.154 







Penalties Outer Weights 
 






 T Statistics  P Values 
Q53 Penalties  -0.111  -0.100  0.155  0.714 
 
0.475 
Q54 Penalties  0.245  0.235  0.177  1.380 
 
0.168 
Q55 Penalties  0.011  0.005  0.214  0.052 
 
0.958 
Q56 Penalties  0.268  0.267  0.211  1.273 
 
0.203 
Q57 Penalties  0.823  0.784  0.109  7.522 
 
0.000 
Q58 Behavioral Intent  0.414  0.411  0.033  12.545 
 
0.000 
Q59 Behavioral Intent  0.347  0.343  0.044  7.809 
 
0.000 
Q60 Behavioral Intent  -0.105  -0.103  0.074  1.411 
 
0.159 








Appendix H:  Frequency Table 
Table H1 
Frequencies 
Q12:  Knowledge of federal Law 




Yes  161  76.7  76.7  76.7 
No  49  23.3  23.3  100.0 
Total  210  100.0  100.0   
 
Q13:  Knowledge of state Law 




Yes  148  70.5  70.5  70.5 
No  58  27.6  27.6  98.1 
I don’t know  4  1.9  1.9  100.0 
Total  210  100.0  100.0   
 
Q14:  Knowledge of ethical requirements 




Yes  190  90.5  90.5  90.5 
No  20  9.5  9.5  100.0 
Total  210  100.0  100.0   
 
Q15:  Protecting sensitive information 




Yes  196  93.3  93.3  93.3 
No  12  5.7  5.7  99.0 
I don’t know  2  1.0  1.0  100.0 
Total  210  100.0  100.0   
 
 




Q16:  Risk of compromise 




Yes  136  64.8  64.8  64.8 
No  7  34.8  34.8  99.5 
I don’t know  1  0.5  0.5  100.0 
Total  210  100.0  100.0   
 
Q17:  Risk assessment 




Yes  68  32.4  32.4  32.4 
No  142  67.6  67.6  100.0 
Total  210  100.0  100.0   
 
Q18:  Liability insurance alone for protection 




Yes  45  21.4  21.4  21.4 
No  165  78.6  78.6  100.0 
Total  210  100.0  100.0   
 
Q19:  All protective measures of sensitive digital information 




Yes  3  1.4  1.4  1.4 
No  207  98.6  98.6  100.0 
Total  210  100.0  100.0   
 
Q20:  Reduce the risk of compromise 




Yes  202  96.2  96.2  96.2 
No  8  3.8  3.8  100.0 
Total  210  100.0  100.0   
 




Q21:  Review of cyber security policies, processes, technologies 




Yes  56  26.7  26.7  26.7 
No  153  72.9  72.9  99.5 
I don’t know  1  0.5  0.5  100.0 
Total  210  100.0  100.0   
 
Q22:  Knowledge of HIPPA, HITECH, FTC, state laws and ethical guidelines 




Strongly agree  144  68.6  68.6  68.6 
Somewhat agree  55  26.2  26.2  94.8 
Neither agree nor disagree  11  5.2  5.2  100.0 
Total  210  100.0  100.0  
Q23:  Confident in my skills         




Strongly agree  60  28.6  28.6  28.6 
Somewhat agree  107  51.0  51.0  79.5 
Neither agree nor disagree  20  9.5  9.5  89.0 
Somewhat disagree  16  7.6  7.6  96.7 
Strongly disagree  7  3.3  3.3  100.0 
Total  210  100.0  100.0   
         
Q24:  Confident in designing policies and processes 




Strongly agree  60  28.6  28.6  28.6 
Somewhat agree  107  51.0  51.0  79.5 
Neither agree nor disagree  20  9.5  9.5  89.0 
Somewhat disagree  16  7.6  7.6  96.7 
Strongly disagree  7  3.3  3.3  100.0 
Total  210  100.0  100.0   




Q25:  Confident about risk assessment 




Yes  104  49.5  49.5  49.5 
No  106  50.5  50.5  100.0 
Total  210  100.0  100.0   
 
Q26:  I can make a difference 




Strongly agree  132  62.9  62.9  62.9 
Somewhat agree  64  30.5  30.5  93.3 
Neither agree nor disagree  10  4.8  4.8  98.1 
Somewhat disagree  3  1.4  1.4  99.5 
Strongly disagree  1  0.5  0.5  100.0 
Total  210  100.0  100.0   
 
Q27:  Confident in implementing protective 




Strongly agree  71  33.8  33.8  33.8 
Somewhat agree  92  43.8  43.8  77.6 
Neither agree nor disagree  17  8.1  8.1  85.7 
Somewhat disagree  24  11.4  11.4  97.1 
Strongly disagree  6  2.9  2.9  100.0 
Total  210  100.0  100.0   
 
Q28:  Confident in reducing risk 




Strongly agree  92  43.8  43.8  43.8 
Somewhat agree  85  40.5  40.5  84.3 
Neither agree nor disagree  11  5.2  5.2  89.5 
Somewhat disagree  21  10.0  10.0  99.5 
Strongly disagree  1  0.5  0.5  100.0 
Total  210  100.0  100.0   





Q29:  Attention to cyber security 




Strongly agree  123  58.6  58.6  58.6 
Somewhat agree  59  28.1  28.1  86.7 
Neither agree nor disagree  21  10.0  10.0  96.7 
Somewhat disagree  4  1.9  1.9  98.6 
Strongly disagree  3  1.4  1.4  100.0 
Total  210  100.0  100.0   
 
Q30:  Steps to ensure security 




Strongly agree  153  72.9  72.9  72.9 
Somewhat agree  42  20.0  20.0  92.9 
Neither agree nor disagree  12  5.7  5.7  98.6 
Somewhat disagree  1  0.5  0.5  99.0 
Strongly disagree  2  1.0  1.0  100.0 
Total  210  100.0  100.0   
 
Q31:  Steps to mitigate a breach 




Strongly agree  158  75.2  75.2  75.2 
Somewhat agree  36  17.1  17.1  92.4 
Neither agree nor disagree  14  6.7  6.7  99.0 
Somewhat disagree  1  0.5  0.5  99.5 
Strongly disagree  1  0.5  0.5  100.0 










Q32:  Ensure policies are followed 




Strongly agree  157  74.8  74.8  74.8 
Somewhat agree  42  20.0  20.0  94.8 
Neither agree nor disagree  9  4.3  4.3  99.0 
Somewhat disagree  1  0.5  0.5  99.5 
Strongly disagree  1  0.5  0.5  100.0 
Total  210  100.0  100.0   
 
Q33:  Systems are susceptible to attack 




Strongly agree  34  16.2  16.2  16.2 
Somewhat agree  71  33.8  33.8  50.0 
Neither agree nor disagree  45  21.4  21.4  71.4 
Somewhat disagree  42  20.0  20.0  91.4 
Strongly disagree  18  8.6  8.6  100.0 
Total  210  100.0  100.0   
 
Q34:  Threats are controllable 




Strongly agree  19  9.0  9.0  9.0 
Somewhat agree  102  48.6  48.6  57.6 
Neither agree nor disagree  39  18.6  18.6  76.2 
Somewhat disagree  44  21.0  21.0  97.1 
Strongly disagree  6  2.9  2.9  100.0 










Q35:  Violations result in losses 




Extremely likely  17  8.1  8.1  8.1 
Somewhat likely  55  26.2  26.2  34.3 
Neither likely nor unlikely  57  27.1  27.1  61.4 
Somewhat unlikely  52  24.8  24.8  86.2 
Strongly unlikely  29  13.8  13.8  100.0 
Total  210  100.0  100.0   
 
Q36:  Sensitive data loss in security violations? 




Extremely likely  11  5.2  5.2  5.2 
Somewhat likely  41  19.5  19.5  24.8 
Neither likely nor unlikely  42  20.0  20.0  44.8 
Somewhat unlikely  80  38.1  38.1  82.98 
Strongly unlikely  36  17.1  17.1  100.0 
Total  210  100.0  100.0   
 
Q37:  Information security affects my practice 




Strongly agree  58  27.6  27.6  27.6 
Somewhat agree  75  35.7  35.7  63.3 
Neither agree nor disagree  42  20.0  20.0  83.3 
Somewhat disagree  23  11.0  11.0  94.3 
Strongly disagree  12  5.7  5.7  100.0 










Q38:  Information security is exaggerated 




Strongly disagree  2  1.0  1.0  1.0 
Somewhat disagree  29  13.8  13.8  14.8 
Neither agree nor disagree  40  19.0  19.0  33.8 
Somewhat agree  63  30.0  30.0  63.8 
Strongly agree  76  36.2  36.2  100.0 
Total  210  100.0  100.0   
 
Q39:  Understanding capabilities of attackers 




Strongly agree  60  28.6  28.6  28.6 
Somewhat agree  92  43.8  43.8  72.4 
Neither agree nor disagree  43  20.5  20.5  92.9 
Somewhat disagree  13  6.2  6.2  99.0 
Strongly disagree  2  1.0  1.0  100.0 
Total  210  100.0  100.0   
 
Q40:  Information security inseparable from practice 




Strongly agree  116  55.2  55.2  55.2 
Somewhat agree  75  35.7  35.7  91.0 
Neither agree nor disagree  13  6.2  6.2  97.1 
Somewhat disagree  6.0  2.9  2.9  100.0 











Q41:  Threat actor motivations 




Strongly agree  82  39.0  39.0  39.0 
Somewhat agree  89  42.4  42.4  81.4 
Neither agree nor disagree  34  16.2  16.2  97.6 
Somewhat disagree  4  1.9  1.9  99.5 
Strongly disagree  1  0.5  0.5  100.0 
Total  210  100.0  100.0   
 
Q42:  Awareness of threat 




Yes  177  84.3  84.3  84.3 
No  33  15.7  15.7  100.0 
Total  210  100.0  100.0   
         
Q43:  I care about laws and ethical guidelines 




Strongly agree  174  82.9  82.9  82.9 
Somewhat agree  33  15.7  15.7  98.6 
Neither agree nor disagree  3  1.4  1.4  100.0 
Total  210  100.0  100.0   
 
Q44:  Threat actor motivation 




Strongly agree  135  64.3  64.3  64.3 
Somewhat agree  55  26.2  26.2  90.5 
Neither agree nor disagree  16  7.6  7.6  98.1 
Somewhat disagree  4  1.9  1.9  100.0 
Total  210  100.0  100.0   
 





Q45:  Professional organization follows legal/ethical code 




Strongly agree  180  85.7  85.7  85.7 
Somewhat agree  20  9.5  9.5  95.2 
Neither agree nor disagree  8  3.8  3.8  99.0 
Somewhat disagree  2  1.0  1.0  100.0 
Strongly disagree  76  36.2  36.2  100.0 
Total  210  100.0  100.0   
 
Q46:  Colleagues follow laws and ethics 




Strongly agree  128  61.0  61.0  61.0 
Somewhat agree  59  28.1  28.1  89.0 
Neither agree nor disagree  18  8.6  8.6  97.6 
Somewhat disagree  5  2.4  2.4  100.0 
Total  210  100.0  100.0   
 
Q47:  Others follow laws and ethics 




Yes  88  41.9  41.9  41.9 
No  121  57.6  57.6  99.5 
I don’t know  1  0.5  0.5  100.0 
Total  210  100.0  100.0   
 











Q48:  Aligning practice upholds professional commitments 




Strongly agree  155  73.8  73.8  73.8 
Somewhat agree  46  21.9  21.9  95.7 
Neither agree nor disagree  8  3.8  3.8  99.5 
Somewhat disagree  1  0.5  0.5  100.0 
Total  210  100.0  100.0   
 
Q49:  Compliance with the legal/ethical codes 




Strongly agree  179  85.2  85.2  85.2 
Somewhat agree  21  10.0  10.0  95.2 
Neither agree nor disagree  10  4.8  4.8  100.0 
Total  210  100.0  100.0   
         
Q50:  Practice standards and peer 




Strongly agree  99  47.1  47.1  47.1 
Somewhat agree  64  30.5  30.5  77.6 
Neither agree nor disagree  30  14.3  14.3  91.9 
Somewhat disagree  14  6.7  6.7  98.6 
Strongly disagree  3  1.4  1.4  100.0 













Q51:  Dedicating resources to information/stems 




Strongly agree  119  56.7  56.7  56.7 
Somewhat agree  68  32.4  32.4  89.0 
Neither agree nor disagree  19  9.0  9.0  98.1 
Somewhat disagree  2  1.0  1.0  99.0 
Strongly disagree  2  1.0  1.0  100.0 
Total  210  100.0  100.0   
 
Q52:  I follow legal and ethical policies 




Strongly agree  138  65.7  65.7  65.7 
Somewhat agree  58  27.6  27.6  93.3 
Neither agree nor disagree  10  4.8  4.8  98.1 
Somewhat disagree  4  1.9  1.9  99.5 
Total  210  100.0  100.0   
 
Q53:  There are penalties 




Strongly agree  147  70.0  70.0  70.0 
Somewhat agree  43  20.5  20.5  90.5 
Neither agree nor disagree  16  7.6  7.6  98.1 
Somewhat disagree  3  1.4  1.4  99.5 
Strongly disagree  1  0.5  0.5  100.0 











Q54:  Security breaches have consequences 




Strongly agree  128  61.0  61.0  61.0 
Somewhat agree  59  28.1  28.1  89.0 
Neither agree nor disagree  18  8.6  8.6  97.6 
Somewhat disagree  4  1.9  1.9  99.5 
Strongly disagree  1  0.5  0.5  100.0 
Total  210  100.0  100.0   
 
Q55:  Productivity is threatened by incidents 




Strongly agree  106  50.5  50.5  50.5 
Somewhat agree  69  32.9  32.9  83.3 
Neither agree nor disagree  20  9.5  9.5  92.9 
Somewhat disagree  12  5.7  5.7  98.6 
Strongly disagree  3  1.4  1.4  100.0 
Total  210  100.0  100.0   
 
Q56:  Profitability is threatened by incidents 




Strongly agree  96  45.7  45.7  45.7 
Somewhat agree  75  35.7  35.7  81.4 
Neither agree nor disagree  20  9.5  9.5  91.0 
Somewhat disagree  14  6.7  6.7  97.6 
Strongly disagree  5  2.4  2.4  100.0 










Q57:  Understanding consequences of a breach 




Strongly agree  71  33.8  33.8  33.8 
Somewhat agree  93  44.3  44.3  78.1 
Neither agree nor disagree  18  8.6  8.6  97.6 
Somewhat disagree  20  9.5  9.5  96.2 
Strongly disagree  8  3.8  3.8  100.0 
Total  210  100.0  100.0   
 
Q58:  Reduce penalties 




Strongly agree  132  62.9  62.9  62.9 
Somewhat agree  60  28.6  28.6  91.4 
Neither agree nor disagree  17  8.1  8.1  99.5 
Somewhat disagree  1  0.5  0.5  100.0 
Total  210  100.0  100.0   
 
Q59:  Resources to reduce penalties 




Strongly agree  101  48.1  48.1  48.1 
Somewhat agree  71  33.8  33.8  81.9 
Neither agree nor disagree  29  13.8  13.8  95.7 
Somewhat disagree  7  3.3  3.3  99.0 
Strongly disagree  2  1.0  1.0  100.0 











Q60:  Attention to security  takes time 




Strongly agree  39  18.6  18.6  18.6 
Somewhat agree  74  35.2  35.2  53.8 
Neither agree nor disagree  43  20.5  20.5  74.3 
Somewhat disagree  35  16.7  16.7  91.0 
Strongly disagree  19  9.0  9.0  100.0 
Total  210  100.0  100.0   
 
Q61:  Aligning security with laws and ethics 




Strongly agree  139  66.2  66.2  66.2 
Somewhat agree  51  24.3  24.3  90.5 
Neither agree nor disagree  18  8.6  8.6  99.0 
Somewhat disagree  2  1.0  1.0  100.0 
Total  210  100.0  100.0   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
